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Original sin: Fiscal rules and government debt in foreign currency in developing countries

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  • Apeti, Ablam Estel
  • Bambe, Bao-We-Wal
  • Combes, Jean-Louis
  • Edoh, Eyah Denise

Abstract

Developing economies often borrow abroad in foreign currency, which exposes them to the problem of “original sin.” Although the literature on the issue is relatively extensive, there is limited discussion about the role of fiscal frameworks, such as fiscal rules, in addressing original sin. Using a panel of 59 developing countries from 1990-2020 and applying the entropy balancing method, this study reveals that fiscal rules play a crucial role in reducing government debt in foreign currency, and that the effects are statistically and economically significant and robust. Furthermore, we find that the effectiveness of fiscal rules in curbing original sin is enhanced by factors such as the strengthening of the rule itself, improved fiscal discipline before the reform’s adoption, financial development, financial openness, exchange rate flexibility, the level of economic development, and sound institutions. Finally, transmission channels analysis reveals that the effect of fiscal rules on original sin is driven by fiscal and monetary policy credibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Apeti, Ablam Estel & Bambe, Bao-We-Wal & Combes, Jean-Louis & Edoh, Eyah Denise, 2024. "Original sin: Fiscal rules and government debt in foreign currency in developing countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:80:y:2024:i:c:s0164070424000156
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2024.103600
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal rules; Original sin; Developing countries; Entropy balancing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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