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The impact of fiscal rules on sovereign risk premia: International evidence

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  • Thornton, John
  • Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis

Abstract

We examine whether adopting a numerical fiscal rule framework to guide fiscal policy helps reduce sovereign risk premia in a sample of advanced and developing countries for 1985–2012. We address the self-selection problem of policy adoption by applying propensity score matching methods. The results suggest that adopting fiscal rules reduces sovereign risk premia.

Suggested Citation

  • Thornton, John & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2017. "The impact of fiscal rules on sovereign risk premia: International evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 63-67.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:20:y:2017:i:c:p:63-67
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2016.09.008
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    19. Thornton, John & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2016. "Does inflation targeting reduce sovereign risk? Further evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 237-241.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sawadogo, Pegdéwendé Nestor, 2020. "Can fiscal rules improve financial market access for developing countries?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Afonso, António & Alves, José, 2019. "Short and long-term interest rate risk: The sovereign balance-sheet nexus," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    3. Csaba G. Tóth, 2019. "Valuable legacy? The effect of inherited fiscal rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 3-30, January.
    4. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Hougaard Jensen, Svend E., 2019. "European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 3-21.
    5. Thomas Brändle & Marc Elsener, 2024. "Do fiscal rules matter? A survey of recent evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 160(1), pages 1-38, December.
    6. Apeti, Ablam Estel & Bambe, Bao-We-Wal & Combes, Jean-Louis & Edoh, Eyah Denise, 2024. "Original sin: Fiscal rules and government debt in foreign currency in developing countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    7. Philipp Weber & Laura A. Zell & Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2024. "Functionality of Fiscal Rules in a Low Interest Rate Environment – New Empirical Results for Swiss Cantons," CESifo Working Paper Series 11351, CESifo.
    8. Tóth, Csaba G., 2017. "Own or inherited? The effect of national fiscal rules after changes of government," MPRA Paper 81178, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Csaba G. Tóth & Dávid Berta, 2017. "Fiscal Rules," MNB Handbook, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 2(14), pages 1-60.
    10. Andrian, Leandro Gaston & Valencia, Oscar & Hirs, Jorge & Urrea Rios, Ivan Leonardo, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and Economic Cycles: Quality (Always) Matters," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12639, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. López-Herrera, Carmen & Cordero, José M. & Pedraja-Chaparro, Francisco & Polo, Cristina, 2023. "Fiscal rules and their influence on public sector efficiency," MPRA Paper 119018, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign risk; Fiscal rules; Propensity score matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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