Content
2001, Volume 30, Issue 1
- 1-18 The generation of formulas held in common knowledge
by Robert Samuel Simon - 19-39 Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations
by Quan Wen & Taiji Furusawa - 41-60 Repeated communication through the mechanism
by Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille - 61-78 A value for mixed action-set games
by Emilio Calvo & J. Carlos Santos - 79-98 On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
by Jeroen Kuipers & Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern - 99-106 On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs
by Francis Chu & Joseph Halpern - 107-116 Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium
by William H. Sandholm - 117-139 The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
by Peter Sudhölter & Jos A. M. Potters - 141-146 On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
by Carsten Helm
2001, Volume 29, Issue 4
- 473-486 Replication invariance on NTU games
by Emilio Calvo & Iñaki Garci´a & José M. Zarzuelo - 487-494 Stability in coalition formation games
by Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová - 495-515 When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
by Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton - 517-532 The Owen value values friendship
by Gérard Hamiache - 533-542 On the optimality of a simple strategy for searching graphs
by Shmuel Gal - 543-553 The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
by Ron Holzman - 555-569 Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
by Johan Karlander & Kimmo Eriksson - 571-595 Evolutionarily stable sets
by Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg - 597-623 Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
by Peter Sudhölter & Yan-An Hwang
2000, Volume 29, Issue 3
- 309-325 Two-person repeated games with finite automata
by Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada - 327-338 Population monotonic solutions on convex games
by Toru Hokari - 339-357 Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium
by Licun Xue - 359-364 Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies
by Sylvain Sorin & Jean-Pierre Beaud - 365-374 Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
by Shinji Ohseto - 375-389 Correlated equilibria of games with many players
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg - 391-412 Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies
by Anton Stefanescu - 413-432 First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness
by Gustavo E. Rodriguez - 433-450 Player splitting in extensive form games
by Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen & Andrés Perea y Monsuwé - 451-468 Value theory without symmetry
by Ori Haimanko
2000, Volume 29, Issue 2
- 147-163 The survival value of assuming others to be rational
by Johan Stennek - 165-176 Relative impatience determines preference between contract bargaining and repeated bargaining
by Diane J. Reyniers - 177-188 The multichoice consistent value
by Esther GutiÊrrez & Emilio Calvo & Juan Carlos Santos - 189-209 Independent mistakes in large games
by Ady Pauzner - 211-227 Characterization of optimal strategies in matrix games with convexity properties
by Tadeusz Radzik - 229-240 Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty
by Ruqu Wang - 241-268 Inheritance of properties in communication situations
by Marco Slikker - 269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium
by Jonathan Shalev - 289-303 Games with finite resources
by Thomas S. Ferguson & Costis Melolidakis
2000, Volume 29, Issue 1
- 1-9 Weighted weak semivalues
by E. Calvo & Juan Carlos Santos - 11-22 Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
by Amit K. Biswas & G. Ravindran & T. Parthasarathy - 23-38 The selectope for cooperative games
by Jean Derks & Hans Haller & Hans Peters - 39-61 A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games
by Joachim RosenmØller & Benyamin Shitovitz - 63-79 Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information
by Oscar Volij - 81-92 Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution
by Emilio Calvo & Hans Peters - 93-99 A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives
by Edward M. Bolger - 101-118 Cumbersome coordination in repeated games
by Horst Raff & David Schmidt - 119-126 note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
by Mehmet Bac - 127-132 note: An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value
by Andrzej S. Nowak & Tadeusz Radzik - 133-137 note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
by Toru Hokari - 139-142 note: The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus
by Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada
1999, Volume 28, Issue 4
- 447-463 The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals
by Avner Shaked & Ilan Eshel & Emilia Sansone - 465-488 Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
by Fernando Vega-Redondo & Frédéric Palomino - 489-509 Multisided matching games with complementarities
by Katerina Sherstyuk - 511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
by Youngsub Chun - 521-532 Characterizations of a multi-choice value
by José Zarzuelo & Marco Slikker & Flip Klijn - 533-546 The effect of punishment duration of trigger strategies and quasifinite continuation probabilities for Prisoners' Dilemmas
by Michael A. Jones - 547-565 An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games
by Marc Roubens & Michel Grabisch - 567-583 The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
by Marilda Sotomayor - 585-597 Computing the NTU-Shapley value of NTU-games defined by multiple objective linear programs
by Kim Allan Andersen & Mikael Lind - 599-615 Proper rationalizability and backward induction
by Frank Schuhmacher
1999, Volume 28, Issue 3
- 263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge
by Robert J. Aumann - 301-314 Interactive epistemology II: Probability
by Robert J. Aumann - 315-330 Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
by Joseph Y. Halpern - 331-365 The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge
by John Geanakoplos & (**), Moshe Y. Vardi & Joseph Y. Halpern & Ronald Fagin - 367-384 The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets
by Robert Samuel Simon - 385-408 Approximate common knowledge revisited
by Stephen Morris - 409-434 How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
by Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 435-442 How canonical is the canonical model? A comment on Aumann's interactive epistemology
by Aviad Heifetz
1999, Volume 28, Issue 2
- 157-171 The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach
by Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato - 173-187 Weighted nucleoli
by Hans Haller & Jean Derks - 189-197 Fictitious play in coordination games
by Aner Sela & Dorothea Herreiner - 199-210 The speed of rational learning
by Alvaro Sandroni & Rann Smorodinsky - 211-227 Prosperity properties of TU-games
by J. R. G. van Gellekom & J. A. M. Potters & J. H. Reijnierse - 229-240 On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games
by TamÂs Solymosi - 241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game
by Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner - 253-255 note: On some properties of the -core of games with coalition structure
by Takeshi Naitoh & Akira Nakayama
1999, Volume 28, Issue 1
- 1-14 The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications
by Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy - 15-24 The Folk theorem for dominance solutions
by Alexander Vasin - 25-34 The existence of TU -core in normal form games
by Jingang Zhao - 35-52 "Costless" regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach
by Moshe Bar Niv & Israel Zang - 53-68 Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
by Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings - 69-87 Recall in extensive form games
by Klaus Ritzberger - 89-109 Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence
by Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt - 111-130 Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
by Dale O. Stahl - 131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study
by Nick Feltovich & John Duffy
1998, Volume 27, Issue 4
- 467-500 Spanning network games
by Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler - 501-509 Crowding games are sequentially solvable
by Igal Milchtaich - 511-523 Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing
by William W. Sharkey & Richard P. McLean - 525-537 Stationary and nonstationary strategies in Hotelling's model of spatial competition with repeated pricing decisions
by Kali P. Rath - 539-559 Repeated proximity games
by JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala - 561-576 On saddlepoints of two-person zero-sum games with applications to data verification tests
by Hans-Peter Battenberg & Bernd-Jürgen Falkowski - 577-597 Duality and markovian strategies
by Dinah Rosenberg - 599-609 Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability
by Karl WÄrneryd - 611-616 Note Core and monotonic allocation methods
by David Housman & (*), Lori Clark
1998, Volume 27, Issue 3
- 315-330 On the impact of an event
by Sylvain Sorin - 331-342 Mixing weighted values of non-atomic games
by J. C. Santos & J. M. Zarzuelo - 343-357 The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side
by Jean-FranÚois Mertens - 359-374 Characterization sets for the nucleolus
by D. Granot & F. Granot & W. R. Zhu - 375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games
by Roger B. Myerson - 393-405 Paths leading to the Nash set for nonsmooth games
by Yakar Kannai & (*), Emmanuel Tannenbaum - 407-426 Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
by Ulrich Kamecke - 427-441 Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
by E. Elisabet RutstrÃm - 443-450 Note Computing the nucleolus of min-cost spanning tree games is NP-hard
by Jeroen Kuipers & Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern - 451-459 Note On the core of a collection of coalitions
by Hans Reijnierse & Jean Derks
1998, Volume 27, Issue 2
- 161-189 On implementation via demand commitment games
by (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta - 191-200 On consistent solutions for strategic games
by Graziano Pieri & Fioravante Patrone & Anna Torre & Stef Tijs - 201-210 Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case
by Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin - 211-217 Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games
by (*), J. Sánchez-Soriano & Stef Tijs & Ana Meca-Martínez & I. García-Jurando - 219-229 Weak topology and infinite matrix games
by Luciano Mendez-Naya - 231-244 -Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
by Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin - 245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations
by Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta - 257-267 Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs
by A. Maitra & W. Sudderth - 269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
by Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok - 301-303 A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
by Theo S. H. Driessen - 305-309 Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property
by Hannu Salonen & Klaus Kultti
1998, Volume 27, Issue 1
- 1-19 On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions
by Mitsunobu Miyake - 21-35 Multi-level evolution in population games
by José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo - 37-47 The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games
by Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs & Peter Borm & Gert-Jan Otten - 49-59 Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs
by Christian Ewerhart - 61-81 On the existence of good stationary strategies for nonleavable stochastic games
by Piercesare Secchi - 83-92 Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers
by Mario Rui Pascoa - 93-109 Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation
by Tristan Tomala - 111-130 Geanakoplos and Sebenius model with noise
by Doron Sonsino - 131-145 Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
by Jesßs-Mario Bilbao - 147-156 Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
by Wojciech Olszewski
1998, Volume 26, Issue 4
- 423-438 A Demand Adjustment Process
by William R. Zame & Michael Maschler & Elaine Bennett - 439-453 Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games
by Amit Pazgal - 455-472 On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies
by Yves Sprumont - 473-490 Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"
by Stephen Ching - 491-499 On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set
by Stef Tijs & Carles Rafels - 501-524 Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions
by Clara Ponsati & Joel Watson - 525-547 Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games
by Ross Cressman - 549-559 On the Asymptotic Convergence to Mixed Equilibria in 2 x 2 Asymmetric Games
by MarÎa SÂez-MartÎ - 561-577 Convex Covers of Symmetric Games
by John M. Rulnick & Lloyd S. Shapley - 579-582 Note Some Bounds for Markov Chains
by Mark B. Cronshaw & Levon S. Kazarian
1997, Volume 26, Issue 3
- 283-302 Quasi-Cores in Bargaining Sets
by Ken-Ichi Shimomura - 303-314 Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games
by Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze - 315-333 Finitely Additive and Epsilon Nash Equilibria
by Massimo Marinacci - 335-351 Ternary Voting Games
by MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal - 353-359 A Theorem on the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game
by Martin Shubik & Thomas Quint - 361-366 On the Complexity of Testing Membership in the Core of Min-Cost Spanning Tree Games
by Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern & Winfried Hochstättler & Sándor P. Fekete - 367-377 Minimum Cost Forest Games
by Jeroen Kuipers - 379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities
by Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander - 403-408 Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes
by Frank Thuijsman & Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan - 409-417 note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game
by Ulrich Kamecke
1997, Volume 26, Issue 2
- 147-182 The Modified Nucleolus: Properties and Axiomatizations
by Peter SudhÃLter - 183-191 The Deceptive Number Changing Game, in the Absence of Symmetry
by Bert Fristedt - 193-205 On the Core of Routing Games
by Jean Derks & Jeroen Kuipers - 207-214 The Reactive Bargaining Set of Some Flow Games and of Superadditive Simple Games
by Daniel Granot & Frieda Granot & Weiping R. Zhu - 215-221 On the Infiltration Game
by P. Goutal & A. Garnaev & G. Garnaeva - 223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games
by Abraham Neyman - 229-234 A Note on Repeated Games with Non-Monotonic Value
by Leeat Yariv - 235-248 Effectivity Functions and Simple Games
by Ton Storcken - 249-266 A Cooperative Analysis of Covert Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries
by Jingang Zhao - 267-273 note: Existence of Nash Equilibria for Generalized Games without Upper Semicontinuity
by Paolo Cubiotii - 275-278 note: On the Finiteness of Stable Sets
by Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen & John Hillas
1997, Volume 26, Issue 1
- 1-10 Automorphisms and Weighted Values
by Guillermo Owen & Francesc Carreras - 11-25 Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems
by Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan - 27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure
by RenÊ van den Brink - 45-50 Stability of the Core Mapping in Games with a Countable Set of Players
by Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy - 51-59 The Kernel for Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game
by Kensaku Kikuta - 61-73 The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games
by Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin - 75-95 The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games
by Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler - 97-111 A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games
by Yukihiko Funaki & Kees Hoede & Harry Aarts - 113-136 Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form
by Amnon Rapoport - 137-141 note: On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value without the Additivity Axiom
by Andrzej S. Nowak
1996, Volume 25, Issue 4
- 411-425 Continuity Properties of Bargaining Solutions
by Salonen, Hannu - 427-435 A Note on the Characterizations of the Compromise Value
by Otten, Gert-Jan & Borm, Peter & Tijs, Stef - 437-453 Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - 455-473 Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies
by Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam - 475-494 Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games
by Rapoport, Amnon & Sundali, James A - 495-517 Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A & Palfrey, Thomas R
1996, Volume 25, Issue 3
- 269-287 An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games
by Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R - 289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games
by Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L - 303-327 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment
by Harrison, Glenn W & McCabe, Kevin A - 329-353 Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study
by Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans - 355-383 An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections
by Forsythe, Robert & Rietz, Thomas & Myerson, Roger & Weber, Robert - 385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation
by Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep
1996, Volume 25, Issue 2
- 137-148 Isomorphism in 3-Person Games
by Xu, Shaoji - 149-160 Core, Value and Equilibria for Market Games: On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley
by Butnariu, Dan & Klement, Erich Peter - 161-176 Canonical Monotone Decompositions of Fractional Stable Matchings
by Abeledo, Hernan G & Blum, Yosef & Rothblum, Uriel G - 177-188 Mediated Talk
by Lehrer, Ehud - 189-198 The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games
by Deb, Rajat & Weber, Shlomo & Winter, Eyal - 199-205 On Equilibrium on the Square
by Vieille, Nicolas - 207-217 Conditional Systems Revisited
by Vieille, Nicolas - 219-244 The Kernel/Nucleolus of a Standard Tree Game
by Granot, D & Maschler, M & Owen, G & Zhu, W.R. - 245-258 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments
by Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz
1996, Volume 25, Issue 1
- 1-12 A Generalization of the Nash Equilibrium Theorem on Bimatrix Games
by Gowda, M Seetharama & Sznajder, Roman - 13-34 The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms
by Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef - 35-41 A Note on Correlated Equilibrium
by Evangelista, Fe S & Raghavan, T E S - 43-49 On Quasi-Stable Sets
by Vermeulen, A J & Potters, J A M & Jansen, M J M - 51-64 Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
by Funk, Peter - 65-71 Equivalence between Bargaining Sets and the Core in Simple Games
by Einy, Ezra & Wettstein, David - 73-92 Finding Mixed Strategies with Small Supports in Extensive Form Games
by Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod - 93-111 Zero-Sum Continuous Games with No Compact Support
by Mendez-Naya, Luciano - 113-134 The Least Square Prenucleolus and the Least Square Nucleolus. Two Values for TU Games Based on the Excess Vector
by Ruiz, Luis M & Valenciano, Federico & Zarzuelo, Jose M
1995, Volume 24, Issue 4
- 323-344 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives
by Guth, Werner - 345-356 Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms
by Abdou, J - 357-372 Computing the Nucleolus When the Characteristic Function Is Given Implicitly: A Constraint Generation Approach
by Hallefjord, Asa & Helming, Reidun & Jornsten, Kurt