IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v29y2000i3p309-325.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Two-person repeated games with finite automata

Author

Listed:
  • Abraham Neyman

    (Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, ISRAEL and SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA)

  • Daijiro Okada

    (Department of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA)

Abstract

We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on strategies available to a player. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly. Results from the study of zero sum case provide the individually rational payoff levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2000. "Two-person repeated games with finite automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 309-325.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:309-325
    Note: Received February 1997/revised version March 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/0029003/00290309.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Neyman, Abraham & Spencer, Joel, 2010. "Complexity and effective prediction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 165-168, May.
    2. Hernández, Penélope & Solan, Eilon, 2016. "Bounded computational capacity equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 342-364.
    3. Abraham Neyman & Joel Spencer, 2006. "Complexity and Effective Prediction," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000527, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
    5. Sylvain Béal, 2010. "Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 183-204, August.
    6. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001945, David K. Levine.
    7. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2009. "Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 404-425, May.
    8. Daijiro Okada & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Growing Strategy Sets in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 625, Econometric Society.
    9. O'Connell, Thomas C. & Stearns, Richard E., 2003. "On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 107-136, April.
    10. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
    11. Dargaj, Jakub & Simonsen, Jakob Grue, 2023. "A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    12. Béal, Sylvain, 2007. "Perceptron Versus Automaton∗," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-58, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    repeated games; finite automata;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:309-325. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.