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note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game

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  • Ulrich Kamecke

    (Humboldt-UniversitÄt zu Berlin, Lehrstuhl Wirtschaftspolitik, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

Suppose that we have a two player game in which we want to test experimentally whether the subjects learn to play the game theoretic solution. For this purpose we need a matching scheme which assures that a rational subject behaves in each round of the experiment as if he played a separate stage game. In this paper we show that such a `best-reply-structure-preserving matching scheme' has to be free of repercussion effects, and that the rotation of two equally sized groups of subjects, which was introduced by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, solves the problem efficiently.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrich Kamecke, 1997. "note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 409-417.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:409-417
    Note: Received October 1995 Revised version August 1996 Final version December 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
    2. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2016. "Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 101-121, June.
    3. Greiff, Matthias & Ackermann, Kurt & Murphy, Ryan O., 2016. "The influences of social context on the measurement of distributional preferences," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145529, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
    5. Pereira, Paulo T. & Silva, Nuno & Silva, Joao Andrade e, 2006. "Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 406-422, March.
    6. Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2003. "Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 24/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    7. Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick, 2002. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-27, April.
    8. Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A., 1999. "Common Agency and Computational Complexity : Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper 1999-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    9. Anderhub, Vital & Engelmann, Dirk & Guth, Werner, 2002. "An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 197-216, June.
    10. Katrin Schmelz & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2015. "Social Distance and Control Aversion: Evidence from the Internet and the Laboratory," TWI Research Paper Series 100, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    11. Ghidoni, Riccardo & Cleave, Blair L. & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 148-159.
    12. Sönke Hoffmann & Benedikt Mihm & Joachim Weimann, 2014. "To Commit or not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4835, CESifo.
    13. Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014. "Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 41-55.
    14. Both, F. & Adam, M.T.P. & Hariharan, A. & Dorner, V. & Lux, E. & Weinhardt, C., 2016. "A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 235-238.
    15. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Prat, Andrea, 2001. "Inefficient equilibria in lobbying," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 349-375, December.
    16. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2013. "Is a firm a firm? A Stackelberg experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 7, pages 1-26.
    17. Jana Krajcova & Andreas Ortmann, 2008. "Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of “Natural” Framing," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp372, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    18. Matthias Greiff & Kurt A. Ackermann & Ryan O. Murphy, 2018. "Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-25, October.
    19. Jana Krajcova, 2008. "Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of Change in Parameterization," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp370, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    20. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01261036 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Falk, Armin & Gachter, Simon & Kovacs, Judit, 1999. "Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 251-284, June.
    22. Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December.
    23. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental 9905002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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