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Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Janos Flesch

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Frank Thuijsman

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Koos Vrieze

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary $\epsilon $-equilibria $(\epsilon > 0)$ do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

Suggested Citation

  • Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze, 1997. "Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 303-314.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:303-314
    Note: Received: September 1995 Revised Version: February 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
    2. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games," Discussion Papers 1272, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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