IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v29y2000i2p241-268.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Inheritance of properties in communication situations

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Slikker

    (Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the possibilities for cooperation between the players are restricted because communication between the players is restricted. The bilateral communication possibilities are modeled by means of a (communication) graph. We are interested in how the communication restrictions influence the game. In particular, we investigate what conditions on the communication graph guarantee that certain appealing properties of the original game are inherited by the graph-restricted game, the game that arises once the communication restrictions are taken into account. We study inheritance of the following properties: average convexity, inclusion of the Shapley value in the core, inclusion of the Shapley values of a game and all its subgames in the corresponding cores, existence of a population monotonic allocation scheme, and the property that the extended Shapley value is a population monotonic allocation scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Slikker, 2000. "Inheritance of properties in communication situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(2), pages 241-268.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:241-268
    Note: Received May 1998/Revised version January 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/0029002/00290241.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schouten, Jop & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter, 2019. "The Nucleolus and Inheritance of Properties in Communication Situations," Discussion Paper 2019-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Schouten, Jop, 2022. "Cooperation, allocation and strategy in interactive decision-making," Other publications TiSEM d5d41448-8033-4f6b-8ec0-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Alexandre Skoda, 2020. "Inheritance of Convexity for the P˜min-Restricted Game," Post-Print halshs-02967120, HAL.
    4. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar, 2003. "Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core," Working Papers in Economics 110, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    5. Alexandre Skoda, 2020. "Inheritance of Convexity for the P˜min-Restricted Game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02967120, HAL.
    6. A. Skoda, 2021. "Inheritance of convexity for the $$\mathcal {P}_{\min }$$ P min -restricted game," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 93(1), pages 1-32, February.
    7. Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2004. "Cooperation and allocation," Other publications TiSEM ab33e762-204c-46e2-86b1-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. J. Schouten & B. Dietzenbacher & P. Borm, 2022. "The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1117-1135, November.
    9. Alexandre Skoda, 2020. "Inheritance of Convexity for the P˜min-Restricted Game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20020, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    communication situations · properties · inheritance;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:241-268. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.