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Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property

Author

Listed:
  • Hannu Salonen

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku, 20500 Turku, Finland)

  • Klaus Kultti

    (Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all strictly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannu Salonen & Klaus Kultti, 1998. "Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 305-309.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:305-309
    Note: Received January 1997/Final version June 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2019. "Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 86-89.
    2. Sobel, Joel, 2019. "Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.

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