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Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Author

Listed:
  • Abraham Neyman

    (Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel)

  • Sylvain Sorin

    (Laboratoire d'EconomÊtrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France)

Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin, 1998. "Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 201-210.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:201-210
    Note: Received March 1996/Revised version January 1997/Final version May 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
    3. Xiaochi Wu, 2022. "Existence of value for a differential game with asymmetric information and signal revealing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 213-247, March.
    4. Xiaochi Wu, 2021. "Differential Games with Incomplete Information and with Signal Revealing: The Symmetric Case," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 863-891, December.
    5. Xavier Venel, 2015. "Commutative Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 403-428, February.
    6. Eilon Solan, 1999. "Three-Player Absorbing Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 669-698, August.
    7. Rida Laraki, 2010. "Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 53-69, March.
    8. Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt & Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus & Neyman, Abraham, 2021. "Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 213-230.
    9. Solan, Eilon, 2000. "Absorbing Team Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 245-261, May.
    10. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.

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