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Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes

Author

Listed:
  • Frank Thuijsman

    (Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, email: frank@math.unimaas.nl)

  • Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan

    (Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, 851 South Morgan Room 517, Chicago, IL 60607-7045, USA email: t.e.raghavan@uicvm.cc.uic.edu)

Abstract

For n-person perfect information stochastic games and for n-person stochastic games with Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average $ \epsilon $-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Thuijsman & Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan, 1997. "Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 403-408.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:403-408
    Note: Received September 1994 Revised version March 1995 Final version June 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Stochastic games: Recent results," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 1833-1850, Elsevier.
    2. Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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