Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.002
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- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006. "Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12698, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009.
"Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2005. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-13, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Lien, Yuanchuan, 2014.
"An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 506-533.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Yuanchuan Lien, 2009. "An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction," IEW - Working Papers 428, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009.
"Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
08-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2008. "Budget Constraints And Demand Reduction In Simultaneous Ascending‐Bid Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, March.
- Lim, Wooyoung & Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Does jump bidding increase sellers’ revenue? Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 84-110.
- Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.
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More about this item
Keywords
Auction; Multiple object auctions; Simultaneous auctions; Synergy; Complementarity; Exposure problem; Threshold problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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