On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.002
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023.
"Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 591-623, February.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 328, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 24368, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Jonathan Ma & Scott Duke Kominers, 2018. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 19-011, Harvard Business School.
- Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020.
"Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.
- Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2018. "Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms," Papers 1812.10326, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
- Bando, Keisuke & Hirai, Toshiyuki & Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 503-512.
- Klijn, Flip & Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2014.
"A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 63-73.
- Flip Klijn, 2011. "A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 877.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Flip Klijn & Ay?e Yaz?c?, 2014. "A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"," Working Papers 567, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013.
"Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2011. "Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States Military Academy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 782, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Hassidim, Avinatan & Romm, Assaf & Shorrer, Ran I., 2019. "Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 40-42.
- Zhang, Jun, 2016. "On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 230-234.
- Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2024.
"The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 113-134, February.
- Agustín G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2022. "The Lattice of Envy-Free Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts," Working Papers 155, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guinazu & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2022. "The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts," Papers 2206.10758, arXiv.org.
- N. Roketskiy, 2012. "Farsightedly Stable Matchings," Working Papers 12-26, NET Institute.
- Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2015. "Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 552-573.
- Tayfun Sönmez, 2013.
"Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186-219.
- Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 783, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2016.
"Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2014. "Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 872, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Tam'as Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jank'o & Akihisa Tamura & Alexander Teytelboym, 2015. "Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts," Papers 1510.01210, arXiv.org, revised May 2018.
- Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
- Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2013. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment. N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 14.05 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result" (August 2014)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- He Yiming & Luo Biliang & Zou Baoling, 2018. "Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Chao Huang, 2023. "Concave many-to-one matching," Papers 2309.04181, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
Keywords
Many-to-many matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract design; Unitarity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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