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Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Author

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  • Lehrer, Ehud
  • Rosenberg, Dinah
  • Shmaya, Eran

Abstract

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:179-191
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
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    11. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
    12. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
    2. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    5. de Oliveira, Henrique, 2018. "Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 126-131.
    6. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "A geometric Blackwell’s order," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    7. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
    8. Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2017. "Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 595-629, August.
    9. Ina Taneva, 2019. "Information Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 151-185, November.
    10. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    11. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie, 2020. "Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    12. Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.
    13. Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
    14. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incomplete information; Information structure; Correlated equilibrium; Garbling; Robustness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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