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The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not

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Cited by:

  1. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo‐Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  2. Blattman, Christopher & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago & Duncan, Gustavo, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," SocArXiv 5nyqs, Center for Open Science.
  3. Barone, Guglielmo & Narciso, Gaia, 2015. "Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 98-110.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September.
  5. Blattman, Christopher & Duncan, Gustavo & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago, 2022. "State-building on the Margin: An Urban Experiment in Medellín," SocArXiv 3bncz, Center for Open Science.
  6. Sonnabend, Hendrik, 2015. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil? Clients’ Punishment in the Market for Sex Services with Voluntary and Involuntary Providers," EconStor Preprints 110682, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  7. Naddeo, Andreina, 2014. "How crime affects the economy: evidence from Italy," MPRA Paper 65419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Kurzfeld, Jonathan, 2024. "Strategic anarchy; a model of prison violence as a means to informal governance and rent extraction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  9. Haris Gazdar & Hussain Bux Mallah, 2013. "Informality and Political Violence in Karachi," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 50(15), pages 3099-3115, November.
  10. Lavinia Piemontese, 2021. "Uncovering Illegal and Underground Economies: The Case of Mafia Extortion Racketeering," Working Papers halshs-02928546, HAL.
  11. David Skarbek, 2010. "Putting the "Con" into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 183-211.
  12. Oleg V. Pavlov & Jason M. Sardell, 2023. "Economic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: A Simulation Feedback Model," Papers 2304.07975, arXiv.org.
  13. Scognamiglio, Annalisa, 2018. "When the mafia comes to town," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 573-590.
  14. Catherine Hafer & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 2005. "Commitment Problems and the Political Economy of States and Mafias," 2005 Meeting Papers 812, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Buonanno, Paolo & Durante, Ruben & Prarolo, Giovanni & Vanin, Paolo, 2011. "On the historical and geographic origins of the Sicilian mafia," MPRA Paper 37009, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
  16. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
  17. Ennio E. Piano, 2018. "Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 350-376, August.
  18. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
  19. J. Mark Ramseyer, 2016. "Nuclear Power and the Mob: Extortion in Japan," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 487-515, September.
  20. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo, 2013. "Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," SciencePo Working papers hal-03460966, HAL.
  21. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
  22. Porreca, Zachary, 2023. "Gentrification, gun violence, and drug markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 235-256.
  23. Titeca, Kristof & Vervisch, Thomas, 2008. "The Dynamics of Social Capital and Community Associations in Uganda: Linking Capital and its Consequences," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2205-2222, November.
  24. Villani, Salvatore & Mosca, Michele & Castiello, Mauro, 2019. "A virtuous combination of structural and skill analysis to defeat organized crime," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 51-65.
  25. Ramos, Miguel A. & Ashby, Nathan J., 2013. "Heterogeneous firm response to organized crime: Evidence from FDI in Mexico," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 176-194.
  26. Capuano, Carlo & Purificato, Francesco, 2012. "The macroeconomic impact of organized crime: a neo-Kaleckian perspective," MPRA Paper 40077, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2020. "Why did pre-modern states adopt Big-God religions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 373-394, March.
  28. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Households production in State and stateless societies: three tales and one letter," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 67(1), pages 31-45, March.
  29. Dimico, Arcangelo & Isopi, Alessia & Olsson, Ola, 2017. "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1083-1115, December.
  30. Aarhaug, Jørgen & Olsen, Silvia, 2018. "Implications of ride-sourcing and self-driving vehicles on the need for regulation in unscheduled passenger transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 573-582.
  31. Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 37-40.
  32. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2024. "Rebel Financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," SocArXiv 38r2h_v1, Center for Open Science.
  33. Wallace, Rodrick & Fullilove, Robert E., 2014. "State policy and the political economy of criminal enterprise: mass incarceration and persistent organized hyperviolence in the USA," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 17-31.
  34. Brishti Guha, 2015. "“Inferiority” complex? Policing, private precautions and crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 97-106, February.
  35. Adrian Leiva, 2024. "“It’s All about Who You Know”: Investigating the Involvement Process in Regard to Organised Criminal Groups within Australia," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-20, September.
  36. Tomás E. Murphy & Martín Rossi, 2017. "Following the Poppy Trail: Causes and Consequences of Mexican Drug Cartels," Working Papers 130, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Dec 2017.
  37. Mauro Castiello & Michele Mosca & Salvatore Villani, 2015. "Analisi di resilienza delle reti complesse ed efficacia delle politiche pubbliche di contrasto alla criminalit? organizzata," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(116), pages 39-73.
  38. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/16jvuuvsuc939q3mrra3k9t0sa is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx_v1, Center for Open Science.
  40. Vladimir Vladimirovich Maltsev, 2022. "Yo-Ho-Ho, and a Bottle of Vodka: The Governance of the Russian Ushkuiniki Pirates," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Spring 20), pages 47-59.
  41. Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2011. "The effect of mafia on public transfers," Trinity Economics Papers tep2111, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  42. Dominic P. Parker & Jeremy D. Foltz & David Elsea, 2016. "Unintended consequences of economic sanctions for human rights: Conflict minerals and infant mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," WIDER Working Paper Series 124, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  43. Heller, William B. & Sieberg, Katri K., 2010. "Honor among thieves: Cooperation as a strategic response to functional unpleasantness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 351-362, September.
  44. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
  45. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2007. "Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1944, CESifo.
  46. Faria João Ricardo & Mixon Franklin G. & Upadhyaya Ashish & Upadhyaya Kamal P., 2019. "Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-30, July.
  47. Iain W. Long, 2017. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 541-576, September.
  48. Cayli Baris, 2012. "The Impossible Mission: Global Justice Movement Against Transnational Organized Crime," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-26, May.
  49. Rute Imanishi Rodrigues, 2005. "O Lugar Dos Pobres E A Violência Na Cidade: Um Estudo Para O Município De São Paulo," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 154, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  50. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
  51. Bruce L. Benson, 2010. "Conclusion," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Bruce L. Benson (ed.), Property Rights, chapter 13, pages 257-299, Palgrave Macmillan.
  52. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo, 2013. "Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460966, HAL.
  53. Cortney Stephen Rodet, 2017. "Poor institutions as a comparative advantage," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 167-192, June.
  54. Charles Okeahalam & Kennedy Otwombe, 2016. "Socioeconomic development and the risk of maritime piracy," Journal of Transportation Security, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 125-160, December.
  55. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  56. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2011. "Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 147-150, May.
  57. Piemontese, Lavinia, 2023. "Uncovering illegal and underground economies: The case of mafia extortion racketeering," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
  58. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
  59. Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "An economic approach to analyzing civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
  60. Sonnabend, Hendrik & Stadtmann, Georg, 2018. "Good intentions and unintended evil? Adverse effects of criminalizing clients in paid sex markets with voluntary and involuntary prostitution," Discussion Papers 400, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  61. Blattman, Christopher & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago & Duncan, Gustavo, 2024. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," SocArXiv 5nyqs_v1, Center for Open Science.
  62. Patricia Justino, 2012. "Shared Societies and Armed Conflict: Costs, Inequality and the Benefits of Peace," Working Papers 2012/35, Maastricht School of Management.
  63. Juan Carlos Munoz Mora & José Antonio Fortou & Sandra L Johansson & Jorge Giraldo-Ramirez, 2015. "This land is My Land: Understanding the Relationship between Armed Conflict and Land in Uraba, Colombia," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  64. Beqiraj, Elton & Fedeli, Silvia & Giuriato, Luisa, 2020. "Policy tolerance of economic crime? An empirical analysis of the effect of counterfeiting on Italian trade," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  65. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, March.
  66. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2024. "Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," SocArXiv 7bp4n, Center for Open Science.
  67. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
  68. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
  69. Peter T. Leeson & David B. Skarbek, 2010. "Criminal constitutions," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 279-297, August.
  70. Daniel J. D'Amico, 2017. "The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(5), pages 1107-1132, November.
  71. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2011. "Unemployment and gang crime: can prosperity backfire?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 259-273, September.
  72. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2024. "Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," SocArXiv 7bp4n_v1, Center for Open Science.
  73. Paolo Pinotti, 2012. "The Economic Costs of Organized Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy," Working Papers 054, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
  74. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 29-38.
  75. Soumya Balasubramanya & Joseph P. G. Price & Theodore M. Horbulyk, 2018. "Impacts Assessments without True Baselines: Assessing the Relative Effects of Training on the Performance of Water User Associations in Southern Tajikistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-28, July.
  76. Lavinia Piemontese, 2020. "Uncovering Illegal and Underground Economies: The Case of Mafia Extortion Racketeering," Working Papers 2025, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  77. Michael Spanbauer, 2017. "Self-defense Policy, Justified Homicides, and Race," Working Papers 1708, Tulane University, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2018.
  78. Francesca M. Calamunci & Livio Ferrante & Rossana Scebba & Gianpiero Torrisi, 2023. "Mafia doesn't live here anymore: Antimafia policies and housing prices," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 1001-1025, September.
  79. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  80. Gaetano Perone, 2018. "I costi della criminalità organizzata nel settore agroalimentare italiano," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 71(281), pages 37-66.
  81. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
  82. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
  83. Alexander Fink, 2015. "Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood meets positive political economy of anarchy: A review essay," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 93-105, March.
  84. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  85. Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107025806, January.
  86. David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
  87. DeAngelo, Gregory, 2012. "Making space for crime: A spatial analysis of criminal competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 42-51.
  88. Peter T. Leeson & Douglas Bruce Rogers, 2012. "Organizing Crime," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 89-123.
  89. Candela, Rosolino A., 2020. "The political economy of insecure property rights: insights from the Kingdom of Sicily," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 233-249, April.
  90. Elton Beqiraj & Silvia Fedeli & Luisa Giuriato, 2019. "How do organized crime and counterfeit interact in Italian trading firms? An empirical analysis of their effects on trade," Working Papers in Public Economics 187, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
  91. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Governance efficiency with and without government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 183-200, January.
  92. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
  93. Norgaard, Julia R. & Walbert, Harold J. & Hardy, R. August, 2018. "Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 877-899, October.
  94. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.
  95. Liza Weinstein, 2008. "Mumbai's Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 22-39, March.
  96. Kløve, Eva & Mehlum, Halvor, 2017. "The Firm and the self-enforcing dynamics of crime and protection," Memorandum 06/2017, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  97. Soeren C. Schwuchow, 2023. "Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 469-509, June.
  98. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2012. "Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 455-459.
  99. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
  100. Anna I. Efimova, 2018. "Illicit Transnational Enterprises and the State," Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law, Center for Crisis Society Studies, vol. 11(1).
  101. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/16jvuuvsuc939q3mrra3k9t0sa is not listed on IDEAS
  102. Dominic P. Parker & Jeremy D. Foltz & David Elsea, 2016. "Unintended consequences of economic sanctions for human rights: Conflict minerals and infant mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-124, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  103. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
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