Analisi di resilienza delle reti complesse ed efficacia delle politiche pubbliche di contrasto alla criminalit? organizzata
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- Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
- Alexander Gutfraind, 2012. "Optimizing Network Topology for Cascade Resilience," Springer Optimization and Its Applications, in: My T. Thai & Panos M. Pardalos (ed.), Handbook of Optimization in Complex Networks, chapter 0, pages 37-59, Springer.
- Mary F. McGuire, 2014. "Pancreatic Cancer: Insights from Counterterrorism Theories," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 265-276, December.
- Walter Enders & Xuejuan Su, 2007. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 33-57, February.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Z19 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Other
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