Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System
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DOI: 10.1561/105.00000011
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Cited by:
- Franklin G. Mixon & Chandini Sankaran, 2019. "Men in Grey Suits: Shark Activity and Congestion of the Surfing Commons," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-15, June.
- Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
- DeAngelo, Gregory & Humphreys, Brad R. & Reimers, Imke, 2017. "Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 151-163.
- Faria João Ricardo & Mixon Franklin G. & Upadhyaya Ashish & Upadhyaya Kamal P., 2019. "Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-30, July.
- David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
- Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
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