Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization
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- Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Economics Working Papers 366, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
References listed on IDEAS
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JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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