Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net
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- Jason Chan & Shu He & Dandan Qiao & Andrew B. Whinston, 2019. "Shedding Light on the Dark: The Impact of Legal Enforcement on Darknet Transactions," Working Papers 19-08, NET Institute.
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