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Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally

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  • SKARBEK, DAVID

Abstract

Why does prison social order vary around the world? While many of the basic characteristics of prisons are similar globally, the extent and form of informal inmate organization varies substantially. This article develops a governance theory of prison social order. Inmates create extralegal governance institutions when official governance is insufficient. The size and demographics of the prison population explain why inmates produce extralegal governance institutions in either decentralized ways, such as ostracism, or through more centralized forms, such as gangs. Comparative analysis of Brazil, Bolivia, England, Scandinavia, and men's and women's prisons in California provide empirical support.

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  • Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:110:y:2016:i:04:p:845-862_00
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    Cited by:

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    2. Harris, Colin, 2018. "Institutional solutions to free-riding in peer-to-peer networks: a case study of online pirate communities," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 901-924, October.
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    8. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2018. "The lightship in economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 479-506, September.
    9. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
    10. Escalante, Edwar E., 2020. "Night watchers and terrorists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 116-131.
    11. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
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    13. Palagashvili,Liya & Piano,Ennio & Skarbek,David, 2017. "The Decline and Rise of Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316649176, January.

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