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Yo-Ho-Ho, and a Bottle of Vodka: The Governance of the Russian Ushkuiniki Pirates

Author

Listed:
  • Vladimir Vladimirovich Maltsev

    (King's College London)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Vladimirovich Maltsev, 2022. "Yo-Ho-Ho, and a Bottle of Vodka: The Governance of the Russian Ushkuiniki Pirates," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Spring 20), pages 47-59.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1832
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo‐Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
    2. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
    3. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 161-188, January.
    5. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
    6. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anarchy; pirates; Russia; ritual combat; blood oath; ushkuiniki;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • N83 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P49 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Other

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