The Firm and the self-enforcing dynamics of crime and protection
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002.
"Plunder & Protection Inc,"
Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 447-459, July.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Development and Comp Systems 0210002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Plunder & Protections Inc," Memorandum 10/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992.
"Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
- Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Anderson, James E. & Bandiera, Oriana, 2005. "Private enforcement and social efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 341-366, August.
- Avinash K. Dixit, 2007. "Economics With and Without the Law, from Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance," Introductory Chapters, in: Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press.
- Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, 2000.
"An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 755-789.
- Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, 1998. "An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances," NBER Working Papers 6592, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 263-270, Springer.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1997. "Credible threats in extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Poutvaara, Panu & Priks, Mikael, 2007.
"Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2710, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2007. "Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1944, CESifo.
- Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Long, Iain W., 2015.
"Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 46-61.
- Long, Iain W., 2014. "Better Feared than Loved: Reputations and the Motives for Conflict," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2014/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2002.
"Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages [Investitionsanreize bei unvollständigen Eigentumsrechten: die Rolle von Asymmetrien in Aneignungskonflikten]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-18, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Kai A. Konrad, 2002. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CESifo Working Paper Series 698, CESifo.
- Caruso Raul, 2006.
"Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game),"
Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-53, September.
- Caruso, Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," MPRA Paper 214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006.
- Leeson,Peter T., 2014.
"Anarchy Unbound,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107025806, November.
- Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107629707, November.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 2007.
"Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
- Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Economics Working Papers 366, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Blattman, Christopher & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago & Duncan, Gustavo, 2021.
"Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance,"
SocArXiv
5nyqs, Center for Open Science.
- Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," NBER Working Papers 28458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
- de Miguel-Arribas, A. & Morón-Vidal, J. & Floría, L.M. & Gracia-Lázaro, C. & Hernández, L. & Moreno, Y., 2024. "Contests in two fronts," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
- Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2005. "Violent Groups and Police Tactics: Should Tear Gas Make Crime Preventers Cry?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1639, CESifo.
- Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008.
"Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July.
- Alexander R. W. Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2002. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 762, CESifo.
- Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-455, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015.
"Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 261, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Post-Print hal-03392970, HAL.
- P. Buonanno & R. Durante & G. Prarolo & P. Vanin, 2012. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Working Papers wp844, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the origins of the Sicilian mafia," Working Papers 2012/29, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03392970, HAL.
- Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011.
"A generalized Tullock contest,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Sheremeta, Roman & Chowdhury, Subhasish, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," MPRA Paper 52102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," Working Papers 10-08, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Testa, Patrick A., 2021. "Shocks and the spatial distribution of economic activity: The role of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 791-810.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2000.
"In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, October.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 1996. "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 126, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020.
"Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities," Post-Print hal-02056492, HAL.
- Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007.
"Contests with Multi‐tasking,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
- Clark, Derek & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Contests with multi-tasking [Contests with Multi-Tasking]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-14, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Clark, Derek J. & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Contests with multi-tasking," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 125, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Clark, Derek J. & Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Contests with multi-tasking," Munich Reprints in Economics 22095, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012.
"War and natural resource exploitation,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
- Frederick van der Ploeg & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "War and natural resource exploitation," IEW - Working Papers 481, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Rick Van der Ploeg & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "War and Natural Resource Exploitation," OxCarre Working Papers 042, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Frederick Van der Ploeg & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "War and Natural Resource Exploitation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3244, CESifo.
- Eduardo Zambrano, 1999. "Formal Models Of Authority," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 115-138, May.
More about this item
Keywords
Organized crime; violence;JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- L80 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2017_006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mari Strønstad Øverås (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/souiono.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.