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Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective

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Cited by:

  1. Korok Ray, 2007. "Performance Evaluations and Efficient Sorting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 839-882, September.
  2. Henneberger, Fred & Sousa-Poza, Alfonso, 2002. "Beweggründe und Determinanten zwischenbetrieblicher Mobilität: Die Schweiz in einer internationalen Perspektive (Motives and determinants of job-to-job mobility : Switzerland in an international persp," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 35(2), pages 205-231.
  3. Daniel Herbold & Heiner Schumacher, 2020. "Relational retention," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(4), pages 490-502, June.
  4. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2000. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0021, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  5. K. Sonin & I. Khovanskaya & M. Yudkevich, 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 12.
  6. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2010. "The Layoff Rat Race," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(1), pages 185-210, March.
  7. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2023. "Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 220, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  8. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
  9. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
  10. Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2006. "Individual and collective determinants of academic scientists' productivity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, March.
  11. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 201-229.
  12. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017. "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2695-2730, September.
  13. Glazer, Amihai, 2012. "Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 432-438.
  14. Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Careers in firms: estimating a model of learning, job assignment, and human capital aquisition," Staff Report 469, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  15. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  16. Daniel Gibbs, 2019. "Selection rates and bureaucratic performance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 159-181, June.
  17. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2004. "The effects of a consolation match on the promotion tournament," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 264-281, June.
  18. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2019. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 187-246.
  19. Felipe Balmaceda & Paola Sevilla, "undated". "Invirtiendo en Entrenamiento General: El Programa de Formación Dual," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv136, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  20. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  21. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2018. "Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines: The role of commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 377-422, June.
  22. Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
  23. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
  24. Steven E. Phelan & Zhiang Lin, 2001. "Promotion Systems and Organizational Performance: A Contingency Model," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 207-232, October.
  25. Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Die Up-or-out-Regel," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  26. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
  27. Peter Hoeschler & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2017. "The Relative Importance of Personal Characteristics for the Hiring of Young Workers," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0142, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), revised Jan 2018.
  28. Arellano-Bover, Jaime & Saltiel, Fernando, 2021. "Differences in On-the-Job Learning across Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 14473, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  29. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2011. "Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  30. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
  31. Demougin, Dominique & Siow, Aloysius, 1996. "Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1483-1499, August.
  32. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
  33. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  34. Jens MohrenweiserBy & Gabriele Wydra-Somaggio & Thomas Zwick, 2020. "Information advantages of training employers despite credible training certificates," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 651-671.
  35. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
  36. Lalith Munasinghe & Brendan O'Flaherty, 2005. "Specific Training Sometimes Cuts Wages and Always Cuts Turnover," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 213-234, April.
  37. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316, June.
  38. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. David Tan & Christopher I. Rider, 2017. "Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(9), pages 1848-1874, September.
  40. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
  41. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  42. Kevin Lang & Russell Weinstein, 2016. "A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers," NBER Working Papers 22387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
  44. Michael Dinerstein & Isaac M. Opper, 2022. "Screening with Multitasking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9869, CESifo.
  45. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 2007. "Esteem and ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 373-383, July.
  46. Lisa B. Kahn, 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 165-205, October.
  47. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
  48. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
  49. Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2012. "Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 13-33, September.
  50. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
  51. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
  52. Christian Grund, 2006. "Selektionseffekte und Vermittlungserfolge privater Arbeitsvermittlung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 212-234, March.
  53. Sergey V. Popov, 2015. "Tenure-track contract helps self-selection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2482-2486.
  54. Downar, Benedikt & Ernstberger, Jürgen & Koch, Christopher, 2021. "Who makes partner in Big 4 audit firms? – Evidence from Germany," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  55. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Gaston, Noel, 2004. "Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 599-622, October.
  56. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby & Zwick, Thomas, 2015. "Work-related ability as source of information advantages of training employers," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  57. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  58. Jed DeVaro & Suman Ghosh & Cindy Zoghi, 2018. "Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 389-434, July.
  59. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490, June.
  60. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Talent discovery and poaching under asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116044, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  61. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  62. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 2002. "Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1153-1185, July.
  63. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
  64. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  65. Ori Zax, 2017. "Promotion Policies at Different Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1045-1054.
  66. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
  67. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573, September.
  68. Núria Rodríquez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona School of Economics.
  69. Myers, Erica, 2020. "Asymmetric information in residential rental markets: Implications for the energy efficiency gap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  70. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments In Market Equilibrium," Working Paper 1193, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  71. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "A failure of the market for college education and on-the-job human capital," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  72. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques.
  73. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
  74. Elena Pastorino & Braz Camargo, 2005. "Dynamic Screening: A Role for Up-or-Out Contracts," 2005 Meeting Papers 766, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  75. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
  76. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  77. Rosemary Walker, 2005. "Empirical analysis of up-or-out rules for promotion policies," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 29(2), pages 172-186, June.
  78. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  79. Yasushi Ohkusa, 2001. "An Empirical Examination of the Quit Behavior of Professional Baseball Players in Japan," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(1), pages 80-88, February.
  80. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-519, July.
  81. Ying Wu, 2003. "Substitution between wages and on-the-job training in an optimal labor contract," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 369-383.
  82. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
  83. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  84. Chen, Zhao & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2009. "Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 300-308, March.
  85. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  86. Nicolas Carayol, 2003. "The incentive properties of the Matthew Effect in the academic competition," Working Papers of BETA 2003-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  87. Günter Strobl & Edward D. Van Wesep, 2013. "Publicizing Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 918-932, April.
  88. Dr. Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand, 2013. "Teaching Strategy as Excellence Organization Mission," Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, Educational Research Multimedia & Publications,India, vol. 4(2), pages 16-28, May.
  89. Henneberger, Fred & Sousa-Poza, Alfonso, 2002. "Beweggründe und Determinanten zwischenbetrieblicher Mobilität: Die Schweiz in einer internationalen Perspektive (Motives and determinants of job-to-job mobility : Switzerland in an international persp," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 35(2), pages 205-231.
  90. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
  91. Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph, 2020. "Talent Management and Global Competition for Top Talent: A Co-Opetition-Based Perspective," MPRA Paper 101113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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