When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms
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- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 201-229.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006. "When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_477, Levy Economics Institute.
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- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016.
"Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2019.
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- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2016. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," Working Paper Series WP-2016-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Barlevy, Gadi & Neal, Derek, 2016. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 9858, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2017. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 23824, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Derek Neal & Gadi Barlevy, 2016. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," 2016 Meeting Papers 492, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Maija Halonen‐Akatwijuka, 2010.
"Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(307), pages 544-564, July.
- Maija Halonen, 2002. "Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 02/540, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2008.
"Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-up and Firm Organization,"
NBER Chapters, in: Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance, pages 229-241,
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- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2008. "Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 229-241, June.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-INO-2006-10-21 (Innovation)
- NEP-KNM-2006-10-21 (Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy)
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