Why tenure?
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
academic tenure; labour contract; up-or-out;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2009-05-02 (Education)
- NEP-IPR-2009-05-02 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAB-2009-05-02 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2009-05-02 (Sociology of Economics)
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