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Teaching Strategy as Excellence Organization Mission

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  • Dr. Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand

    (Department of Industrial Management, Tabriz Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran.)

Abstract

During the last decade, theoretical and empirical researches have indicated that organizational teaching as a process occurs in various sites and situations, and it should not viewed from only economic-profit perspective. Individual organizational teaching in organizations' context includes the actions of key actors at every level for creating value in the organization. Generally, teaching strategy behavior in organizations regarded as a tool for organizations' growth and profitability, strategic innovation, organizational and customer-oriented changes. This article attempts to explain the teaching plan strategy by patterns of thinking. The importance of strategic, long-term policy and teaching plan strategy is very clear to planners. Teaching managers like to follow a similar and routine teaching behavioral pattern. Teaching plan strategy, normally taken, as a part of teaching planning, therefore also tends to run in cycles of around last years. Implementing excellence organization can give a competitive advantage and help foster goodwill toward teaching strategy approach. Studies on corporate organizational teaching have possessed an increasing growth. The rise of intense competition among the domestic and global markets has revealed the crucial role of organizational teaching in actualization and maintenance of competitive privilege development in the teaching organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dr. Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand, 2013. "Teaching Strategy as Excellence Organization Mission," Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, Educational Research Multimedia & Publications,India, vol. 4(2), pages 16-28, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aii:ijcmss:v:4:y:2013:i:2:p:16-28
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