IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/umiodp/62021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Die Up-or-out-Regel

Author

Listed:
  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

Die Up-or-out-Regel besagt, dass Assistenten in Partnerschaften (oder auch Universitäten) nach einer gewissen Zeit zu Partnern aufsteigen oder die Partnerschaft verlassen müssen. Eine dauerhafte Assistententätigkeit ist nicht möglich. Dies wirft die Frage auf, warum nicht Assistent bleiben darf, wer auf dieser Position seine Kosten mehr als erwirtschaftet, auch wenn seine Produktivität zur Beförderung zum Partner nicht ausreicht. Es werden unterschiedliche ökonomische Erklärungsansätze zur Beantwortung dieser Frage untersucht. Nach Zurückweisung des weit verbreiteten, aber unplausiblen Ansatzes, dass die Partnerschaft zur Selbstbindung an ihr implizites Beförderungsversprechen Assistenten in deren eigenem Interesse entlassen muss, lautet die Antwort, dass in Partnerschaften die fragliche Situation gar nicht auftritt und die Anwendung der Up-or-out-Regel deshalb als effizient einzuschätzen ist.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Die Up-or-out-Regel," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/235518/1/1762313626.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Promotion Rules and Skill Acquisition: An Experimental Study," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(294), pages 259-297, May.
    2. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    3. Demougin, Dominique & Siow, Aloysius, 1994. "Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1261-1277, December.
    4. O'Flaherty, Brendan & Siow, Aloysius, 1995. "Up-or-Out Rules in the Market for Lawyers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 709-735, October.
    5. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
    6. Siow, Aloysius, 1998. "Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-173, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
    3. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
    5. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    6. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
    7. Demougin, Dominique & Siow, Aloysius, 1996. "Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1483-1499, August.
    8. Oreopoulos, Philip & Heisz, Andrew, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques.
    9. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
    12. Steven E. Phelan & Zhiang Lin, 2001. "Promotion Systems and Organizational Performance: A Contingency Model," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 207-232, October.
    13. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    14. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
    15. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    16. Jed DeVaro & Suman Ghosh & Cindy Zoghi, 2018. "Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 389-434, July.
    17. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Bac, Mehmet & Saglam, Ismail, 1999. "Managerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growth," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(7), pages 917-940, October.
    19. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Gaston, Noel, 2004. "Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 599-622, October.
    20. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2019. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 187-246.
    21. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
    22. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ilmuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.