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Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, in the long run traders may fail to coordinate exclusively in market clearing institutions.

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  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2003. "Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?," Vienna Economics Papers vie0319, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0319
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl, 2010. "On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 215-243, March.
    2. Arthur Schram & Jordi Brandts & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," Working Papers 316, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Schram, Arthur & Brandts, Jordi & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2010. "Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1035-1058, November.
    4. Cédric Ghetty & Vincent Chauvet, 2009. "The Informational Role of Virtual Communities: The Influence of Meta-information [Le rôle informationnel joué par les communautés virtuelles : l’influence de la méta-information]," Post-Print hal-01801112, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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