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A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation

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  • Mackenzie, Andrew

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC)

Abstract

We prove that if a stochastic (social choice) rule has an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) implementation (Li, 2016), then it has such an implementation through a randomized round table mechanism, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which the agents take turns making public announcements about their private information. When restricted to deterministic rules, our result improves upon other recent revelation principles by relaxing all recall requirements and by allowing all game trees compatible with normal forms (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016); we also establish robustness to player randomization using novel solution concepts involving mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. We use our result to provide a justification for ordinal mechanisms in the spirit of Carroll (2017), and we provide a simple characterization of the deterministic rules with OSP-implementations using deterministic round table mechanisms and ordinary strategy-proofness.

Suggested Citation

  • Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Research Memorandum 014, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018014
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    3. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2016. "The Theory of Extensive Form Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, Springer, number 978-3-662-49944-3, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    3. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    4. Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    5. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    6. Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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