Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?
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- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023.
"A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 14043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Noga Alon & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Dominance Solvability in Random Games," Working Papers 2021-84, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
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More about this item
Keywords
Simple mechanisms; complex mechanisms; robust mechanism design; dominant-strategy mechanisms; obviously strategy-proof mechanisms; strongly obviously strategy-proof mechanisms;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2020-07-20 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DES-2020-07-20 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2020-07-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2020-07-20 (Operations Research)
- NEP-SEA-2020-07-20 (South East Asia)
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