Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures
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- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio, 2020. "Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 533-547.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Paolo Leonetti & Fabio Maccheroni, 2019. "Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures," Working Papers 655, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023.
"Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Julien Manili, 2021. "Belief change, Rationality, and Strategic Reasoning in Sequential Games," Working Papers 679, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2020. "Reduced normal forms are not extensive forms," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 281-288, October.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Generoso, Nicolò, 2024.
"Information flows and memory in games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 356-376.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Nicolò Generoso, 2021. "Information Flows and Memory in Games," Working Papers 678, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2019-11-25 (Game Theory)
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