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All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof

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  • R. Pablo Arribillaga
  • Jordi Massó
  • Alejandro Neme

Abstract

For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof," Working Papers 1108, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
    7. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    8. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
    9. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    10. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    11. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    12. Takuma Wakayama, 2017. "Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 357-385, August.
    13. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Research Memorandum 014, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    3. Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024. "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers 2404.11883, arXiv.org.
    4. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    5. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Mass'o & Alejandro Neme, 2024. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Papers 2409.05315, arXiv.org.
    6. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    8. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    obvious strategy-proofness; sequential allotment rules; Division Problem; Single-peaked preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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