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The Rainforests of Cameroon : Experience and Evidence from a Decade of Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Topa
  • Alain Karsenty
  • Carole Megevand
  • Laurent Debroux

Abstract

In 1994, the Government of Cameroon introduced an array of forest policy reforms, both regulatory and market-based, to support a more organized, transparent, and sustainable system for accessing and using forest resources. This report describes how these reforms played out in the rainforests of Cameroon. The intention is to provide a brief account of a complex process and identify what worked, what did not, and what can be improved. The barriers to placing Cameroon's forests at the service of its people, its economy, and the environment originated with the extractive policies of successive colonial administrations. The barriers were further consolidated after independence through a system of political patronage and influence in which forest resources became a coveted currency for political support. These deeply entangled commercial and political interests have only recently, and reluctantly, started to diverge. In 1994, the government introduced an array of forest policy reforms, both regulatory and market based. The reforms changed the rules determining who could gain access to forest resources, how access could be obtained, how those resources could be used, and who will benefit from their use. This report assesses the outcomes of reforms in forest-rich areas of Cameroon, where the influence of industrial and political elites has dominated since colonial times.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Topa & Alain Karsenty & Carole Megevand & Laurent Debroux, 2009. "The Rainforests of Cameroon : Experience and Evidence from a Decade of Reform," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2683.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:2683
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    File URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2683/496220REPLACEM101Official0Use0Only1.pdf?sequence=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nuesiri, Emmanuel O., 2022. "Good governance of local forest is neither easy nor cheap: Policy learning from Bimbia-Bonadikombo," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    2. Tieguhong, Julius Chupezi & Ingram, Verina & Mala, William Armand & Ndoye, Ousseynou & Grouwels, Sophie, 2015. "How governance impacts non-timber forest product value chains in Cameroon," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-10.
    3. Dupuits, Emilie & Ongolo, Symphorien, 2020. "What does autonomy mean for forest communities? The politics of transnational community forestry networks in Mesoamerica and the Congo Basin," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 17(C).
    4. Olufunso A Somorin & Ingrid J Visseren-Hamakers & Bas Arts & Anne-Marie Tiani & Denis J Sonwa, 2016. "Integration through interaction? Synergy between adaptation and mitigation (REDD+) in Cameroon," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 34(3), pages 415-432, May.
    5. Gyldas Ofoulhast†Othamot, 2018. "The conundrum between political and sectoral decentralizations: The case of Cameroon," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(3), pages 347-367, May.
    6. Carodenuto, Sophia & Cerutti, Paolo Omar, 2014. "Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) in Cameroon: Perceived private sector benefits from VPA implementation," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 55-62.
    7. Doremus, Jacqueline, 2020. "How does eco-label competition affect environmental benefits? The case of Central Africa's forests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    8. Samndong, Raymond Achu & Bush, Glenn & Vatn, Arild & Chapman, Melissa, 2018. "Institutional analysis of causes of deforestation in REDD+ pilot sites in the Equateur province: Implication for REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 664-674.
    9. Josiane Gakou-Kakeu & Monica Gregorio & Jouni Paavola & Denis Jean Sonwa, 2024. "To what extent is REDD + integrated into land-use sectors driving deforestation? Insights from Cameroon," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(11), pages 27855-27883, November.

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