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Design of Combined Auction Model for Emission Rights of International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Other Pollutants Based on SMRA

Author

Listed:
  • Hongpeng Guo

    (College of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

  • Zhihao Lv

    (College of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

  • Junyi Hua

    (College of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

  • Hongxu Yuan

    (College of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

  • Qingyu Yu

    (College of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China)

Abstract

In this paper, the combined transactions for emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants in forestry have been taken as the research object, and the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) theory has been used to design a new model for the current auction transactions. In this paper, the feasibility and application of the SMRA model of reach object are studied by the methods of simulation experiment, model analysis, and analogical analysis, and the promotion of this model is discussed. The results show that the new auction model designed in this paper fills in the blank of the combined auction of international forestry carbon sequestration and other pollutant emission rights. It successfully eliminates the winners’ curse and the losses of the sellers. Meanwhile, it provides a new way of resolving ecological deficits problems, achieving the ultimate goal of an overall reduction in carbon and pollution emission. Moreover, it’s beneficial in resolving the structural contradictions between ecological purification and pollutants discharge, hence maximizing the benefits for all the stakeholders. Finally, it is suggested that the SMRA should be adopted in the international trading of emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants to promote the emission reduction of greenhouse gases and pollutants.

Suggested Citation

  • Hongpeng Guo & Zhihao Lv & Junyi Hua & Hongxu Yuan & Qingyu Yu, 2021. "Design of Combined Auction Model for Emission Rights of International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Other Pollutants Based on SMRA," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-18, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:20:p:11200-:d:653523
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