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Specifying A Game-Theoretic Extensive Form As An Abstract 5-Ary Relation

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Abstract

This paper specifies an extensive form as a 5-ary relation (i.e. set of quintuples) which satisfies certain abstract axioms. Each quintuple is understood to list a player, a situation (e.g. information set), a decision node, an action, and a successor node. Accordingly, the axioms are understood to specify abstract relationships between players, situations, nodes, and actions. Such an extensive form is called a "5-form", and a "5-form game" is defined to be a 5-form together with utility functions. The paper's main result is to construct a bijection between (a) those 5-form games with information-set situations and (b) Gm games (Streufert 2021). In this sense, 5-form games equivalently formulate almost all extensive-form games. An application weakens the tree axiom in the presence of the other axioms, which leads to a convenient decomposition of 5-forms.

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  • Peter A. Streufert, 2021. "Specifying A Game-Theoretic Extensive Form As An Abstract 5-Ary Relation," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20213, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:20213
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    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2016. "The Theory of Extensive Form Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, Springer, number 978-3-662-49944-3, June.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
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