Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare
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More about this item
Keywords
Labor Relations Laws; Social Welfare; Bargaining Impasse; Replacement Teachers Laws; Intermittent Strikes Laws; Non-Cooperative Games; Asymmetric Information; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2015-09-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2015-09-18 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2015-09-18 (Law and Economics)
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