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Incentives for care, litigation, and tort reform under self-serving bias

In: Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law

Author

Listed:
  • Claudia M. Landeo
  • Maxim Nikitin
  • Sergei Izmalkov

Abstract

One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia M. Landeo & Maxim Nikitin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2013. "Incentives for care, litigation, and tort reform under self-serving bias," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 6, pages 112-155, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14720_6
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    Cited by:

    1. Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim, 2015. "Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare," Working Papers 2015-11, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    2. Nathalie Chappe & Raphaël Giraud, 2013. "Confidence, Optimism and Litigation: A Litigation Model under Ambiguity," Working Papers hal-04287896, HAL.
    3. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2020. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 71-111.
    4. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," NBER Working Papers 25094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Claudia M. Landeo, 2018. "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler (ed.), Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, chapter 9, pages 247-268, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

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