Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0074
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Cited by:
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2020. "Disclosure and Discovery with fairness," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
- Pecorino, Paul & Solomon, Michael & Van Boening, Mark, 2021. "Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information: An experimental analysis of final offer arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 334-366.
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Keywords
experimental bargaining; asymmetric information; signaling game; voluntary disclosure;All these keywords.
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