Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law
Editor
- Thomas J. Miceli
- Matthew J. Baker
Abstract
Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Tsvetanov, Tsvetan & Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2021. "Products liability with temptation bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 76-93.
- Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim, 2015. "Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare," Working Papers 2015-11, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Emanuela Carbonara & Alice Guerra & Francesco Parisi, 2016. "Sharing Residual Liability: The Cheapest Cost Avoider Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 173-201.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2020.
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 71-111.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers 2018-6, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, revised 19 Sep 2018.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers 126, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," NBER Working Papers 25095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018.
"Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting,"
NBER Working Papers
25094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2018. "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers 2018-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers 127, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Claudia M. Landeo, 2018.
"Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments,"
Chapters, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler (ed.), Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, chapter 9, pages 247-268,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Landeo, Claudia, 2015. "Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 2015-12, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Endres Alfred & Rundshagen Bianca, 2016. "Optimal Penalties for Repeat Offenders – The Role of Offence History," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 545-578, June.
Book Chapters
The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS- Zachary Grossman & Jonathan Pincus & Perry Shapiro, 2013. "Land assemblage: efficiency and equity in public-private projects," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 1, pages 14-32, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, 2013. "The economics of activity levels in tort liability and regulation," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 2, pages 33-53, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Rebecca Rabon & Kathleen Segerson, 2013. "Liability versus regulation for product-related risks," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 3, pages 54-68, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kathleen Segerson & Tsvetan Tsvetanov, 2013. "Regulation versus liability: a behavioural economics perspective," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 4, pages 69-86, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Strict liability when victims choose the value of the asset at risk," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 5, pages 87-111, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Maxim Nikitin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2013. "Incentives for care, litigation, and tort reform under self-serving bias," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 6, pages 112-155, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jef De Mot & Ben Depoorter, 2013. "Tort standards and legal expenditures: a unified model," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 7, pages 156-164, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jef De Mot, 2013. "Litigation success functions," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 8, pages 165-174, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 9, pages 175-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard McAdams, 2013. "Do exclusionary rules convict the innocent?," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 10, pages 193-207, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "Search, seizure and false (?) arrest: an analysis of fourth amendment remedies when police can plant evidence," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 11, pages 208-234, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Matthew J. Baker & Niklas J. Westelius, 2013. "Crime, expectations, and the deterrence hypothesis," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 12, pages 235-280, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Active courts and menu contracts," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 13, pages 281-307, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2013. "The efficiency of affirmative action with purely historical discrimination," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 14, pages 308-340, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Giovanni B. Ramello, 2013. "The multi-layered action of trademark: meaning, law and market," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 15, pages 341-356, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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Keywords
Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;JEL classification:
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