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Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

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  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Alvin E. Roth

Abstract

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient-donor pairs, in cycles and chains of exchange, so each patient receives a compatible kidney. Kidney exchange has become a standard form of transplantation in the United States and a few other countries, in large part because of continued attention to the operational details that arose as obstacles were overcome and new obstacles became relevant. We review some of the key operational issues in the design of successful kidney exchange programs. Kidney exchange has yet to reach its full potential, and the paper further describes some open questions that we hope will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the operational aspects of dynamic exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," NBER Working Papers 28500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28500
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    Cited by:

    1. Alvin E. Roth, 2024. "Market Design and Maintenance," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Klimentova, Xenia & Biró, Péter & Viana, Ana & Costa, Virginia & Pedroso, João Pedro, 2023. "Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(3), pages 1391-1407.
    3. Karen Evelyn Hauge & Snorre Kverndokk & Andreas Lange, 2021. "Why People Oppose Trade Institutions - On Morality, Fairness and Risky Actions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9456, CESifo.
    4. Kristóf Druzsin & Péter Biró & Xenia Klimentova & Rita Fleiner, 2024. "Performance evaluation of national and international kidney exchange programmes with the ENCKEP simulator," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 32(4), pages 923-943, December.
    5. Mehdi Zeynivand & Mehdi Najafi & Mohammad Modarres Yazdi, 2023. "A Recourse Policy to Improve Number of Successful Transplants in Uncertain Kidney Exchange Programs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 197(2), pages 476-507, May.
    6. Michel Callon & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "The design and performation of markets: a discussion," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 11(3), pages 219-239, December.
    7. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    8. Singha, Sumanta & Arha, Himanshu & Kar, Arpan Kumar, 2023. "Healthcare analytics: A techno-functional perspective," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    9. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.
    10. Suresh P. Sethi & Sushil Gupta & Vipin K. Agrawal & Vijay K. Agrawal, 2022. "Nobel laureates’ contributions to and impacts on operations management," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(12), pages 4283-4303, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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