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Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?

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  • Roth, Alvin E.
  • Leider, Stephen

Abstract

The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney market, and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets, and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval towards certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, and between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are \(not\) more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval towards certain transactions – including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally non-market exchanges, such as food preparation.

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  • Roth, Alvin E. & Leider, Stephen, 2010. "Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?," Scholarly Articles 5128483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:5128483
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    2. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    3. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 37-58, Summer.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, Utku & Delmonico, Francis & Saidman, Susan L., 2014. "Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations," MPRA Paper 58246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Berrens, Robert P. & Bohara, Alok K. & Jenkins-Smith, Hank & Silva, Carol & Weimer, David L., 2003. "The Advent of Internet Surveys for Political Research: A Comparison of Telephone and Internet Samples," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-22, January.
    6. Robert Whaples, 2009. "The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members: The Results of a New Survey," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 6(3), pages 337-348, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Projective Paternalism," NBER Working Papers 26119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lemennicier Bertrand & Wenzel Nikolai G., 2021. "Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 27(1), pages 51-74, June.
    3. Alvin E. Roth, 2024. "Market Design and Maintenance," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2018-2047, August.
    5. Julio Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2016. "Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 6085, CESifo.
    6. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario & Stith, Sarah S., 2014. "Removing financial barriers to organ and bone marrow donation: The effect of leave and tax legislation in the U.S," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 43-56.
    7. Julio J. Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2015. "Sacred Values? The Effect of Information on Attitudes toward Payments for Human Organs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 361-365, May.
    8. , & , E., 2014. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    9. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
    10. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    11. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    12. Sandro Ambuehl, 2017. "An Offer You Can't Refuse? Testing Undue Inducement," CESifo Working Paper Series 6296, CESifo.
    13. Eames, K.C. & Holder, Patrick & Zambrano, Eduardo, 2017. "Solving the kidney shortage via the creation of kidney donation co-operatives," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 91-97.
    14. Julio J Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2015. "Markets and Morals: An Experimental Survey Study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(6), pages 1-13, June.
    15. Yew-Kwang NG, 2016. "Extending Economic Analysis to Analyze Policy Issues More Broadly," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1609, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
    16. Tianshu Sun & Susan Feng Lu & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2015. "Solving Shortage in a Priceless Market: Insights from Blood Donation," NBER Working Papers 21312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. John P. Dickerson & Ariel D. Procaccia & Tuomas Sandholm, 2019. "Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1768-1791, April.
    18. Julio Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2017. "Understanding repugnance: Implications for public policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 614, Universidad del CEMA.
    19. Peter T. Leeson, 2019. "Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 29-42, August.
    20. Julio J. Elías & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2019. "Paying for Kidneys? A Randomized Survey and Choice Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(8), pages 2855-2888, August.
    21. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
    22. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2014. "Getting More Organs for Transplantation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 425-430, May.
    23. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    24. van Dalen, Hendrik P. & Henkens, Kène, 2014. "Comparing the effects of defaults in organ donation systems," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 137-142.
    25. Christine L. Exley & Judd B. Kessler, 2018. "Equity Concerns are Narrowly Framed," NBER Working Papers 25326, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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