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Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem

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  • Klimentova, Xenia
  • Biró, Péter
  • Viana, Ana
  • Costa, Virginia
  • Pedroso, João Pedro

Abstract

Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) represent an additional possibility of transplant for patients suffering from end-stage kidney disease. If a patient has a willing living donor with whom the patient is not compatible, the pair recipient–donor can join a pool of incompatible pairs and, if compatibility between recipient and donor in two or more pairs exists, organs can be exchanged between them. The problem can be modelled as an integer program that in general aims at finding the pairs that should be selected for transplant such that maximum number of transplants is performed.

Suggested Citation

  • Klimentova, Xenia & Biró, Péter & Viana, Ana & Costa, Virginia & Pedroso, João Pedro, 2023. "Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(3), pages 1391-1407.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:307:y:2023:i:3:p:1391-1407
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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