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Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents

Author

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  • Francis Bloch
  • David Cantala

Abstract

We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and waste is minimized at the lottery. Punishment schemes accelerate turnover in the queue and information release increases the value of agents at the top of the waiting list.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-122, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:88-122
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Kennes Jr. & Daniel Monte Jr. & Norovsambuu Tumennasan Jr., 2014. "The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 362-406, November.
    2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 1-25, January.
    3. Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2012. "Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 13-33, September.
    4. , & , & ,, 2011. "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
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    6. Stefanos A. Zenios & Glenn M. Chertow & Lawrence M. Wein, 2000. "Dynamic Allocation of Kidneys to Candidates on the Transplant Waiting List," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 48(4), pages 549-569, August.
    7. Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
    8. Xuanming Su & Stefanos Zenios, 2004. "Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: The Role of the Queueing Discipline," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 280-301, June.
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    10. repec:hal:pseose:hal-01013737 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis, 2017. "Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 73-79.
    2. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Nick Arnosti & Peng Shi, 2020. "Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Affordable Housing Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2291-2307, June.
    5. Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "On the Fair Division of a Random Object," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1174-1194, February.
    6. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Working Papers 2021-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    7. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    8. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    9. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    11. Nikhil Agarwal & Itai Ashlagi & Michael A. Rees & Paulo Somaini & Daniel Waldinger, 2021. "Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(1), pages 37-76, January.
    12. Nikhil Agarwal & Itai Ashlagi & Michael A. Rees & Paulo J. Somaini & Daniel C. Waldinger, 2019. "Equilibrium Allocations under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys," NBER Working Papers 25607, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Vincent Iehlé, 2016. "Gradual College Admisssion," Post-Print halshs-02367006, HAL.
    14. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.
    15. Maxey, Tyler, 2023. "Dynamic matching with transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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