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Incentivized Kidney Exchange

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  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M. Utku Ünver
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants.

Suggested Citation

  • Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Incentivized Kidney Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2198-2224, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:7:p:2198-2224
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170950
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014. "Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 105-129.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    4. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
    5. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    6. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2015. "Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 868, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
    8. , & , E., 2014. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    9. Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2013. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1585-1632.
    10. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
    11. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Unver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing," NBER Working Papers 26951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1007, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," Post-Print halshs-02973042, HAL.
    4. Heo, Eun Jeong & Hong, Sunghoon & Chun, Youngsub, 2022. "Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Kratz, Jörgen, 2024. "Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    6. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2020. "Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-87.
    7. Dengji Zhao, 2021. "Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions," Papers 2102.10347, arXiv.org.
    8. Damien Berriaud & Ezzat Elokda & Devansh Jalota & Emilio Frazzoli & Marco Pavone & Florian Dorfler, 2024. "To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions," Papers 2403.04057, arXiv.org.
    9. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    10. Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
    11. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    12. Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 676-704.
    13. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
    14. Kevin Riehl & Anastasios Kouvelas & Michail Makridis, 2024. "Fair Money -- Public Good Value Pricing With Karma Economies," Papers 2407.05132, arXiv.org.
    15. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    16. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2022. "The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 77-91, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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