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Optimal queue to minimize waste

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  • Lei, Xiaochang

Abstract

We study an application of stochastic games in the dynamic allocation of two types of goods when agents have deferral rights. If all individuals strictly prefer one good to the other, the worse good can be wasted by successive rejections. We allow different goods to be allocated in different ways and study the combinations of three popular disciplines in an overloaded waiting list: FCFS (first-come-first-serve), LCFS(last-come-first-serve) and RP(random-priority). The first result is that the LCFS–FCFS queue (the better good allocated under LCFS and the worse good allocated under FCFS) does result in zero waste, but it is unfair. To restore fairness, the agent’s age matters and the older agent has a weakly higher probability of receiving goods. Our second result is that RP–FCFS is fair and induces less expected waste than FCFS when the waiting cost is uniformly distributed.

Suggested Citation

  • Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:123:y:2023:i:c:p:87-94
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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