Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate representation and the allocation of federal budget
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- Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2013. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 257-282, November.
- Leonzio Rizzo & Valentino Larcinese & Cecilia Testa, 2012. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? US Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Working Papers 201215, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
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Citations
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- Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2014. "Fiskalische Nachhaltigkeit und Transferzahlungen," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(07), pages 17-22, April.
- Stratford Douglas & W. Robert Reed, 2013.
"A Replication of "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level (Public Choice, 2005),"
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- Stratford Douglas & W. Robert Reed, 2014. "A Replication of "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level" (Public Choice, 2005)," Working Papers 14-03, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
- Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2015.
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- Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2014. "Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Sustainability," CESifo Working Paper Series 4716, CESifo.
- Maaser, Nicola & Stratmann, Thomas, 2016.
"Distributional consequences of political representation,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 187-211.
- Maaser, Nicola & Stratmann, Thomas, 2014. "Distributional Consequences of Political Representation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100565, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Taeko Hiroi, 2019. "Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(4), pages 642-670.
- Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
- Ali, Amin Masud & Savoia, Antonio, 2023. "Decentralisation or patronage: What determines government's allocation of development spending in a unitary country? Evidence from Bangladesh," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
- Josip Glaurdić & Vuk Vuković, 2017. "Granting votes: exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 223-241, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
federal budget; malapportionment; small state advantage; overrepresentation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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