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Party polarization, political alignment, and federal grant spending at the state level

Author

Listed:
  • William Hankins

    (Jacksonville State University)

  • Gary Hoover

    (University of Oklahoma)

  • Paul Pecorino

    (The University of Alabama)

Abstract

Research on the distribution of federal expenditures has provided mixed evidence showing that states with more legislators who belong to the president’s party and states with more legislators in the chamber majority tend to receive a larger allocation of federal funds. We add to this research by considering how political polarization and political alignment impact these presidential and congressional determinants of how the domestic US budget is distributed to the states. Our results show that states with a larger percentage of senators in the majority can secure a larger share of federal grant expenditures per capita when political polarization is relatively low.

Suggested Citation

  • William Hankins & Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2017. "Party polarization, political alignment, and federal grant spending at the state level," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 351-389, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-017-0196-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0196-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    2. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2019. "Expenditure visibility and voter memory: a compositional approach to the political budget cycle in Indian states, 1959–2012," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 129-157, June.
    3. Ilya A. Vaskin, 2020. "Buying Loyalty Of Voters Or Local Elites? Political Alignment And Transfers To Provinces In Tutelary Regimes: The Case Of Iran," HSE Working papers WP BRP 73/PS/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal spending; Majoritarian; Political alignment; Political polarization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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