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Small States, Big Pork

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  • Hauk, William R.
  • Wacziarg, Romain

Abstract

Using data on authorizations from the 2005 Highway Bill, we show that the legislative allocation of pork barrel spending by U.S. state (measured by the value of transportation earmarks per capita) greatly favors smaller states. We exploit the difference between two versions of the bill: the version that was passed by the House and the compromise version passed in conference committee. Our empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of theories of legislative malapportionment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hauk, William R. & Wacziarg, Romain, 2007. "Small States, Big Pork," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 95-106, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00005048
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00005048
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    Cited by:

    1. Tiberiu Dragu & Jonathan Rodden, 2010. "Representation and regional redistribution in federations," Working Papers 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    2. Alexander Fink & Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 366-395, August.
    3. Stratmann, Thomas, 2013. "The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 341-355.
    4. Boyle, Melissa A. & Matheson, Victor A., 2009. "Determinants of the distribution of congressional earmarks across states," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 63-65, August.
    5. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2013. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 257-282, November.
    6. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2007. "Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? Myth and Reality about the US Senate Malapportionment," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 07/01, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2007.
    7. Clemens, Jeffrey & Veuger, Stan, 2021. "Politics and the distribution of federal funds: Evidence from federal legislation in response to COVID-19," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    8. Jeffrey Clemens & Stan Veuger, 2024. "Intergovernmental Grants and Policy Competition: Concepts, Institutions, and Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Policy Responses to Tax Competition, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.
    10. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Robert P. Van Houweling & Samuel J. Abrams & Peter C. Hanson, 2009. "The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 343-359, April.
    11. Vespa, Emanuel I., 2016. "Malapportionment and multilateral bargaining: An experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 64-74.
    12. Ali, Amin Masud & Savoia, Antonio, 2023. "Decentralisation or patronage: What determines government's allocation of development spending in a unitary country? Evidence from Bangladesh," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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