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Apportionment Cycles as Natural Experiments

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  • Elis, Roy
  • Malhotra, Neil
  • Meredith, Marc

Abstract

Although there are compelling theoretical reasons to believe that unequal political representation in a legislature leads to an unequal distribution of funds, testing such theories empirically is challenging because it is difficult to separate the effects of representation from the effects of either population levels or changes. We leverage the natural experiment generated by infrequent and discrete census apportionment cycles to estimate the distributional effects of malapportionment in the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that changes in representation cause changes in the distribution of federal outlays to the states. Our method is exportable to any democratic system in which reapportionments are regular, infrequent, and nonstrategic.

Suggested Citation

  • Elis, Roy & Malhotra, Neil & Meredith, Marc, 2009. "Apportionment Cycles as Natural Experiments," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 358-376.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:17:y:2009:i:04:p:358-376_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Tiberiu Dragu & Jonathan Rodden, 2010. "Representation and regional redistribution in federations," Working Papers 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    2. Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill H., 2016. "Local favoritism in at-large proportional representation systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 15-26.
    3. Imai, Masami, 2022. "Local economic impacts of legislative malapportionment," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    4. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2013. "Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 257-282, November.
    5. Olle Folke & Linna Martin & Johanna Rickne & Matz Dahlberg, 2021. "Politicians' neighbourhoods: Where do they live and does it matter?," Discussion Papers 2021-03, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    6. Viktor Slavtchev & Simon Wiederhold, 2012. "Technological Intensity of Government Demand and Innovation," ifo Working Paper Series 135, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    7. Jie Zhang, 2021. "More political representation, more economic development? Evidence from Turkey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 275-299, June.
    8. Simon Wiederhold, 2012. "The Role of Public Procurement in Innovation: Theory and Empirical Evidence," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 43.
    9. Viktor Slavtchev & Simon Wiederhold, 2011. "The Impact of Government Procurement Composition on Private R&D Activities," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-036, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Dongwon Lee & Sangwon Park, 2018. "Court-ordered redistricting and the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 507-528, September.

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