Tristan Tomala
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022.
"Long Information Design,"
Post-Print
halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
Cited by:
- Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
- Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021.
"Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games,"
Papers
2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
Cited by:
- Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
- Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020.
"Contracting over persistent information,"
Papers
2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
- Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
- Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Contracting over Persistent Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16896, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Cited by:
- Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024.
"Shuttle diplomacy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022. "Shuttle Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 16934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Emilien Macault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2020.
"Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games,"
Papers
2009.11580, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
Cited by:
- Maria Elena Latino & Marta Menegoli & Fulvio Signore & Maria Chiara De Lorenzi, 2023. "The Potential of Gamification for Social Sustainability: Meaning and Purposes in Agri-Food Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-18, June.
- Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018.
"Interactive Information Design,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," Working Papers hal-01933896, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01791918, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," Post-Print halshs-01791918, HAL.
Cited by:
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019.
"Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games,"
TSE Working Papers
19-1021, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 421, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2017.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 17-863, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
- Renou, Ludovic & Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2021.
"Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
16801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," Papers 2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
- Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1288, HEC Paris.
Cited by:
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018.
"Noisy Persuasion,"
University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics
11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018.
"Noisy Persuasion,"
University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics
11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Rivera, Thomas J & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1289, HEC Paris.
- Thomas Rivera & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game," Working Papers hal-01933853, HAL.
Cited by:
- Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023.
"Equilibria in bottleneck games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 649-685, September.
- Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2018. "Equilibria in Bottleneck Games," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 945, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Wiseman, Jim & Wiseman, Thomas, 2023. "When do traffic reports make traffic better?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
- Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2017.
"Zero-Sum Revision Games,"
TSE Working Papers
17-751, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Zero-sum revision games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
Cited by:
- Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2021. "Dynamic Equilibrium with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 242-269, June.
- Roy, Nilanjan, 2023. "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
- Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017.
"Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1244, HEC Paris.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
Cited by:
- Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023.
"Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach,"
ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series
245, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion With Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_443, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Alon, Shiri & Auster, Sarah & Gayer, Gabi & Minardi, Stefania, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 18428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
- Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021. "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers 2110.08563, arXiv.org.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022.
"Long Information Design,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
- Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018.
"Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment,"
Papers
1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
- Ian M. Schmutte & Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Information Design for Differential Privacy," Papers 2202.05452, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
- Reema Deori & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2024. "Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2408.13822, arXiv.org.
- Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018.
"Noisy Persuasion,"
University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics
11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
- Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2022. "Discovery through Trial Balloons," Papers 2211.02743, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Yunus C. Aybas & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Persuasion with Coarse Communication," Papers 1910.13547, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
- Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Yaron Azrieli, 2021. "Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017.
"Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503768, HAL.
Cited by:
- Simo Sun & Hui Yang & Guanghui Yang & Jinxiu Pi, 2021. "Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(15), pages 1-16, July.
- Tomala , Tristan & Gensbittel , Fabien, 2015.
"Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1074, HEC Paris.
- Fabien Gensbittel & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2015. "Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments," Working Papers hal-02011419, HAL.
Cited by:
- Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
- Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 2022. "Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experiments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
- Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie, 2020. "Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 18-29.
- Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan, 2015.
"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1093, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2015. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games," Working Papers hal-02002783, HAL.
Cited by:
- Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines," Working Paper 5875, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
- Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
- Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Yuichiro Kamada & Michihiro Kandori, 2020. "Revision Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1630, July.
- Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Tristan Tomala, 2013.
"Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games,"
Post-Print
hal-01026126, HAL.
Cited by:
- Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
- Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013.
"Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1015, HEC Paris.
- Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
Cited by:
- Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
- Bruno Sultanum, 2014.
"Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets,"
2014 Papers
psu420, Job Market Papers.
- Sultanum, Bruno, 2018. "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 616-658.
- Bruno Sultanum, 2016. "Financial Fragility and Over-the-Counter Markets," Working Paper 16-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Bruno Sultanum, 2017. "Financial Fragility and Over-the-counter Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers 1122, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018.
"Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
- Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Juan I Block & David K Levine, 2012.
"Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000480, David K. Levine.
- Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
- Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2012. "Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games," Working Papers 2012-031, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2019. "Repeated implementation: A practical characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 336-367.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2012.
"Repeated Games with Complete Information,"
Post-Print
hal-00712075, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated Games with Complete Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00712075, HAL.
Cited by:
- Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011.
"A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning,"
2011 Meeting Papers
181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- ,, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012.
"Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality,"
Post-Print
hal-00718046, HAL.
- Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
Cited by:
- Berliant, Marcus, 2023.
"Daily commuting,"
MPRA Paper
119020, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2023. "Daily commuting," MPRA Paper 116529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2024. "Daily commuting," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Berliant, Marcus, 2020. "Daily commuting," MPRA Paper 100169, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2023. "Daily Commuting," MPRA Paper 119442, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2022. "Daily Commuting," MPRA Paper 113862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022.
"Social learning in nonatomic routing games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
- Emilien Macault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games," Papers 2009.11580, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information,"
Post-Print
hal-00715606, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Cited by:
- Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011.
"Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3360, CESifo.
- Vida Peter & Francoise Forges, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case," Post-Print hal-01252955, HAL.
- , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems,"
Post-Print
hal-00632806, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
Cited by:
- Marie Laclau, 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Somayeh Kokabisaghi & Eric J Pauwels & Andre B Dorsman, 2019. "To snipe or not to snipe, that is the question! Transitions in sniping behaviour among competing algorithmic traders," Papers 1912.04012, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
- Marie Laclau, 2016.
"Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication,"
Working Papers
hal-01285070, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
- Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010.
"Mechanism design and communication networks,"
HEC Research Papers Series
926, HEC Paris.
- , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543603, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
Cited by:
- Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022.
"First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition,"
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series
crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010.
"A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013.
"Network Design under Local Complementarities,"
AMSE Working Papers
1309, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 12 Feb 2013.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00796487, HAL.
- Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Implementation by Sortition in Nonexclusive Information Economies," Economics Working Papers 2015-13, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Informationally optimal correlation,"
Post-Print
hal-00485282, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Informationally optimal correlation," Working Papers hal-00587228, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Informationally optimal correlation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00485282, HAL.
Cited by:
- Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin, 2019. "Playing games with bounded entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 363-380.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
hal-00464537, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
Cited by:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004.
"Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
- Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 163-194.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017.
"How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?,"
TSE Working Papers
17-792, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi, 2016. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2029, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
- McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014.
"Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4700, CESifo.
- Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-01252921, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marie Laclau, 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
- Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013.
"Strategic information exchange,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from private information in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Belief-free price formation,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano, 2017. "Belief-free Price Formation," TSE Working Papers 17-790, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem," Papers 2006.16206, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
- Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
- Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023. "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo, 2009.
"Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs,"
Post-Print
hal-00495690, HAL.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014.
"Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4700, CESifo.
- Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-01252921, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
- Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Belief-free price formation,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano, 2017. "Belief-free Price Formation," TSE Working Papers 17-790, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
- Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
- Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information,"
Post-Print
hal-00459955, HAL.
- Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
- LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," HEC Research Papers Series 845, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Working Papers hal-00580152, HAL.
- Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," HEC Research Papers Series 884, HEC Paris.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2014. "Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency in Dynamic Double Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014.
"Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4700, CESifo.
- Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-01252921, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marie Laclau, 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
- Carlsson, Hans & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 504-507.
- Gabrel, Virginie & Murat, Cécile & Thiele, Aurélie, 2014. "Recent advances in robust optimization: An overview," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 235(3), pages 471-483.
- Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013.
"Strategic information exchange,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2017.
"Observations on Cooperation,"
Working Papers
2017-12, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2020. "Observations on Cooperation," Papers 2006.15310, arXiv.org.
- Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2018. "Observations on Cooperation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2253-2282.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from private information in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2012.
"Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
MPRA Paper
41731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yves Breitmoser, 2015. "Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2882-2910, September.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Belief-free price formation,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano, 2017. "Belief-free Price Formation," TSE Working Papers 17-790, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
- Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
- Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner, 2008.
"Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning,"
Post-Print
hal-00464554, HAL.
- Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 24-32, January.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754314, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Post-Print halshs-00754314, HAL.
Cited by:
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010.
"Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations,"
Discussion Papers
1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Post-Print halshs-00754608, HAL.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754608, HAL.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
- Benjamin Van Roy & Xiang Yan, 2009. "Manipulation Robustness of Collaborative Filtering Systems," Working Papers 09-21, NET Institute, revised Sep 2009.
- Benjamin Van Roy & Xiang Yan, 2010. "Manipulation Robustness of Collaborative Filtering," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(11), pages 1911-1929, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2008.
"Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks,"
Post-Print
hal-00464542, HAL.
Cited by:
- , & ,, 2012.
"Mechanism design and communication networks,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543603, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
- Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems,"
Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Post-Print hal-00632806, HAL.
- Marie Laclau, 2016.
"Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication,"
Working Papers
hal-01285070, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
- Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
- , & ,, 2012.
"Mechanism design and communication networks,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007.
"A Minority Game with Bounded Recall,"
Post-Print
hal-00538967, HAL.
Cited by:
- Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
- Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
- George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016.
"Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once,"
Research Memorandum
036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Perfect information games where each player acts only once," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 965-985, June.
- Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007.
"Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,"
Post-Print
hal-00487954, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00487954, HAL.
Cited by:
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
- Mehrdad Valizadeh & Amin Gohari, 2021. "Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 452-470, May.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- NORA, Vladyslav & UNO, Hiroshi, 2012.
"Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2012050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Nora, Vladyslav & Uno, Hiroshi, 2014. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 866-877.
- Ron Peretz, 2013. "Correlation through bounded recall strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 867-890, November.
- Bavly, Gilad & Neyman, Abraham, 2014.
"Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 71-89.
- Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2014. "Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Series dp659, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017.
"Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1244, HEC Paris.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin, 2019. "Playing games with bounded entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 363-380.
- Olivier Gossner & Johannes Hörner, 2010.
"When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?,"
Post-Print
halshs-00754488, HAL.
- Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
- Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016.
"Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once,"
Research Memorandum
036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Perfect information games where each player acts only once," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 965-985, June.
- Ron Peretz, 2011. "Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies," Discussion Paper Series dp579, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Jiaying Deng & Hossein Ghasemkhani & Yong Tan & Arvind K Tripathi, 2023. "Actions speak louder than words: Imputing users’ reputation from transaction history," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(4), pages 1096-1111, April.
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2006.
"Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation,"
Post-Print
hal-00487960, HAL.
Cited by:
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013.
"Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors,"
Post-Print
hal-00812682, HAL.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gossner, Olivier & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1104, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-23, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 360-377, February.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812682, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000355, David K. Levine.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt,"
Discussion Papers
1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
- Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
- Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017.
"Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity,"
HEC Research Papers Series
1244, HEC Paris.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
- Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008.
"Codification schemes and finite automata,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
- Amparo Urbano Salvador & Penélope Hernández Rojas, 2000. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Olivier Gossner & Johannes Hörner, 2010.
"When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?,"
Post-Print
halshs-00754488, HAL.
- Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel J. Martin, 2020. "Framing, Information, and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 27265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013.
"Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors,"
Post-Print
hal-00812682, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004.
"Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals,"
Working Papers
hal-00242940, HAL.
Cited by:
- Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner, 2004.
"Secret correlation in repeated games with signals,"
Working Papers
hal-00587232, HAL.
Cited by:
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt,"
Discussion Papers
1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
- Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
- Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt,"
Discussion Papers
1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Tristan Tomala, 2004.
"On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring,"
Working Papers
hal-00587231, HAL.
Cited by:
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016.
"Repeated games with public information revisited,"
Working Papers
hal-01285326, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," PSE Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016.
"Repeated games with public information revisited,"
Working Papers
hal-01285326, HAL.
- GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan, 2003.
"Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2003033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Cited by:
- Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series dp336, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997.
"Repeated Proximity Games,"
Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications
97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
Cited by:
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Marie Laclau, 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems,"
Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Post-Print hal-00632806, HAL.
- Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Marie Laclau, 2016.
"Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication,"
Working Papers
hal-01285070, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
- Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- , & ,, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- Polanski, Arnold, 2024. "Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Markus Kinateder, 2006.
"Repeated Games Played in a Network,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Markus Kinateder, 2008. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," Working Papers 2008.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Kinateder, Markus, 2008. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 6377, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A., 2018. "Cooperation in partly observable networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 220-237.
- King, Maia, 2020. "The probabilities of node-to-node diffusion in fixed networks," SocArXiv dfq8y, Center for Open Science.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
Articles
- Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024.
"Contracting over persistent information,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Contracting over Persistent Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16896, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Contracting over persistent information," Papers 2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
- Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022.
"Long information design,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022.
"Interactive Information Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," Working Papers hal-01933896, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01791918, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," Post-Print halshs-01791918, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," HEC Research Papers Series 1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.
- Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022.
"Social learning in nonatomic routing games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Emilien Macault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games," Papers 2009.11580, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019.
"Persuasion with limited communication capacity,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
See citations under working paper version above.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity," HEC Research Papers Series 1244, HEC Paris.
- Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Zero-sum revision games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Zero-Sum Revision Games," TSE Working Papers 17-751, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018.
"Belief-free price formation,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano, 2017. "Belief-free Price Formation," TSE Working Papers 17-790, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
Cited by:
- Yan Han & Xue-Feng Shao & Xin Cui & Xiao-Guang Yue & Kelvin Joseph Bwalya & Otilia Manta, 2019. "Assessing Investor Belief: An Analysis of Trading for Sustainable Growth of Stock Markets," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(20), pages 1-18, October.
- Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017.
"Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015.
"Approximate implementation in Markovian environments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014.
"Secure message transmission on directed networks,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
Cited by:
- Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022.
"First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition,"
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series
crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
- Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022.
"First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition,"
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series
crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- , & ,, 2012.
"Mechanism design and communication networks,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543603, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
- Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
- Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012.
"Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," Post-Print hal-00718046, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"General Properties of Long-Run Supergames,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
Cited by:
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011.
"Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems,"
Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Post-Print hal-00632806, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
- Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008.
"Playing off-line games with bounded rationality,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
Cited by:
- Peretz, Ron, 2012. "The strategic value of recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 332-351.
- Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan, 2008.
"Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 24-32, January.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754314, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Post-Print hal-00464554, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Post-Print halshs-00754314, HAL.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004.
"Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
Cited by:
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Marie Laclau, 2016.
"Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication,"
Working Papers
hal-01285070, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
- Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from private information in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004.
"Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
Cited by:
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013.
"Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,"
Post-Print
halshs-00773412, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00773412, HAL.
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric, 2013. "Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 103-120.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00565157, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Post-Print halshs-00565157, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Marie Laclau, 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Post-Print
halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 163-194.
- Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016.
"Repeated games with public information revisited,"
Working Papers
hal-01285326, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," PSE Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017.
"Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 2201-2256.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
- Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008.
"Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
- Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
- Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009.
"Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
- Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
- Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
- Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala & Johannes Hörner, 2008. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Working Papers hal-00489877, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information,"
Post-Print
hal-00715606, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
- Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005.
"A folk theorem for minority games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
- Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 197-237.
- Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012.
"On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
- Tomala, Tristan, 1999.
"Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.
Cited by:
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005.
"A folk theorem for minority games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
- Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2016. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 166-173.
- Laura Gomez-Ruiz & María J. Sánchez-Expósito, 2020. "The Impact of Team Identity and Gender on Free-Riding Responses to Fear and Cooperation Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(19), pages 1-21, October.
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Tristan Tomala, 1998.
"Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(1), pages 93-109.
Cited by:
- Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00524134, HAL.
- Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016.
"Repeated games with public information revisited,"
Working Papers
hal-01285326, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," PSE Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017.
"Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
- Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008.
"Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
- Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
- Tomala, Tristan, 1999. "Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.
- Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005.
"A folk theorem for minority games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
- Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
- JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998.
"Repeated proximity games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).