Reputation Building under Observational Learning
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- Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022.
"Market screening with limited records,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
- Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Market Screening with Limited Records," Departmental Working Papers 2006, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
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